A Moment of Truth in Sudan: Why Institutional Civil Administration Has Become the Only Option to Save the State and the Economy
Sudan today appears as a country trapped between two systems: a military system that exhausts what remains of its institutions, and a civil system that has never been allowed to consolidate or take root. Between these two paths, the foundations of the state are eroding, public services are deteriorating, and general trust is collapsing, while citizens bear the cost of hesitation, experimentation, and political tensions. In this critical context, voices are rising to argue that the solution no longer lies in further military rounds or fragile agreements, but in restoring institutional civil administration, seen as the only way to rescue the state from the brink of collapse and launch a genuine economic recovery process. This is not an elitist slogan; it is a conclusion imposed by the facts on the ground, the outcome of ten years of cycles of coups and conflicts.
A country that once had one of the region’s largest agricultural sectors is now unable to exploit half of its capacities, not solely because of war, but due to the collapse of management and service systems. Agriculture cannot thrive without functioning irrigation networks; mining cannot generate added value without proper operational oversight; trade cannot organize without passable roads; and no investor will risk capital in an environment lacking reliable institutions. When a stable administrative system is absent, the entire production chain disintegrates, leaving the economy hostage to chaos, warlords, intermediaries, and smuggling. The reality is clear: the state does not collapse because it is poor, but because it lacks administration.
Some military and influential actors promote the idea that security is the primary prerequisite for any economic revival and that stability can only be achieved through a firm grip. But Sudan’s experience shows the opposite: three years of absolute military rule produced neither security nor a halt to the violent expansion of militias, nor reliable public services. The equation promoted as a practical solution—security first, economic reform later—led to neither. A citizen without access to clean water, electricity, or a functioning hospital cares little about who controls checkpoints or who raises the flag in the barracks; what matters is a state capable of fulfilling its essential functions, an institutional rather than personal state, civil rather than military, transparent and independent of arms or narrow interests.
The recurrent failure to reproduce authority without building institutions has transformed institutional civil administration from a mere political option into a national necessity. The issue is not who governs but how the state is managed. Sudan needs a neutral administrative apparatus, independent of political conflicts, capable of managing resources and providing services according to clear rules, not arbitrary directives. Civil administration is not a return to the past or a romantic ideal: it represents the reconstruction of the citizen-state relationship and the protection of the economy from drifting into a war economy based on smuggling and extortion.
The few regions that have maintained some level of services share a common characteristic: the presence of a local civil administration capable of operating despite pressures. Where a legal taxation system exists, goods distribution is organized, and hospitals and schools are effectively managed, citizens perceive the state as still present, even minimally. Conversely, when everything is reduced to military orders and security committees, public service evaporates, and the public sphere becomes a military zone devoid of values and accountability. The difference between the two models separates a state capable of recovery from a state disintegrating from within.
The urgency of civil administration today lies not only in its ability to deliver services but also in its necessity for any economic rescue plan. The IMF, regional donors, and financial institutions cannot inject funds into an administratively unstable environment. Even Arab or African investors require a predictable legal framework and institutions capable of enforcing contracts. Sudan possesses immense resources, yet no one will invest if procedures change at the discretion of an officer or field commander. The economy needs rules, and only a strong institutional civil apparatus can guarantee these rules, remaining stable despite changes in government or leadership.
It must be recognized that building civil administration is not a technical task but a political project requiring the willingness to relinquish absolute control over the state, acceptance of the principle of separation of powers, and restoration of professional competencies marginalized in recent years. Public administration cannot function if decisions are dictated by an influential individual via phone or if positions are awarded based on loyalty rather than competence. Administrative reform in Sudan will only succeed if it is part of a broader process of restructuring power and reducing military influence within state institutions.
Despite the complexities, the path is not blocked. A new political environment is forming, driven either by public pressure tired of war and destruction or by the urgent need for reconstruction and international cooperation. This environment could push political and civil forces to agree on a model based on institutional civil administration as the backbone of the state. It will not be easy, but Sudan has already tried all other options without success: coups, fragile partnerships, strict military rule, security committees. All these paths have led to the same outcomes: declining services, expanding poverty, and eroding trust.
Rebuilding Sudan begins with rebuilding the state, and a state is not built with weapons but with institutions. The goal is not to create a ceremonial civil government but to establish an independent administrative apparatus capable of functioning under any circumstances, protecting public service from coercion, providing citizens with equitable services, and setting the economy on the path to recovery. Without this, conflicts will repeat, agreements will collapse, and the country will oscillate between chaos and stagnation. It is time to recognize that Sudan’s future will not be shaped in barracks but in public administration offices, with clear policies, enforceable laws, and services reaching citizens without intermediaries.
Ultimately, the real solution lies in Sudanese citizens reclaiming their state from the cycle of conflict and rebuilding it on rational foundations: institutional civil administration that protects rights, ensures fair resource distribution, and paves the way for a productive and sustainable economy. This is the only path out of the crisis, not because it is the easiest option, but because it is the only one with a real chance of success.
