Al-Qaeda: Is it still the most dangerous actor in the global jihadist landscape?
Amid rising activity by several regional jihadist groups, al-Qaeda remains a focal point of debate concerning its ability to compete with or maintain influence over the international security environment. In recent years, attention has often shifted to ISIS and its branches, yet al-Qaeda still represents a significant threat owing to its organizational transformations, increased readiness, and adaptability to shifting security contexts.
An analysis published by the Arab Center for Studies on Extremism argues that al-Qaeda “has not disappeared,” contrary to some assumptions; rather, it has changed strategy — moving from a centralized leadership based in Afghanistan to more decentralized, regionally based networks that are better able to maneuver.
The report notes that al-Qaeda’s core leadership came under severe pressure after the killing or capture of several senior figures, prompting the group to bolster its local branches in Africa and South Asia and to deepen cooperation with local insurgencies and movements, rather than focusing primarily on large, internationally oriented spectacular attacks.
At the same time, the organization has renewed its investment in online media and jihadist propaganda, exploiting dark web channels and cryptocurrencies. These clandestine avenues provide more covert recruitment and financing capabilities, making al-Qaeda harder to confront than groups that control fixed territories and therefore present a more visible target.
In Africa, al-Qaeda affiliates — particularly across the Sahel and greater Sahara — rank among the most active. The security vacuums in these regions have furnished fertile ground for operations that al-Qaeda supervises or finances, granting it practical regional influence despite diminished sway at the traditional global jihad center.
In the Middle East, the restructuring of its networks reflects a strategy of “strategic patience”: al-Qaeda does not always seek to open new battlefields but prefers to build local alliances and position itself as a viable alternative within local social and political architectures.
Analysts conclude that it would be inaccurate to claim al-Qaeda currently dominates the global scene with the same force it exhibited prior to 2010. Yet the organization is far from extinct or irrelevant. It has entered a phase of decentralised jihad that could render it more dangerous in some respects: its enhanced ability to operate in the shadows, disperse into resilient cells, and exploit opaque financial and communication channels increases the challenge of detection and counteraction.
