Institutional Civil Administration: The Only Path to Save Sudan from Collapse and Restore Its Economy
Amid the deep political and economic collapse Sudan has endured for years, a growing conviction has emerged across wide segments of society: the continuation of military governance is no longer a viable option. Repeated wars, endless coups and improvised decisions have only worsened the crisis instead of containing it. As human and material losses accumulate, the need for an institutional civil solution has become evident—not a symbolic transition to civilian rule, but a genuine project to build a state governed by law and institutions, driven by a development vision that does not rely on armed force to administer society or the economy.
Sudan’s reality has shown that military decision-making paralyzes essential public services. Hospitals lack equipment, schools lack qualified teachers, electricity only reaches most cities sporadically, and access to drinking water has become a daily struggle in vast regions. This crisis is not merely the result of the latest war; it is the cumulative outcome of decades of mismanagement, during which civil institutions were undermined, the public sector weakened and turned into a tool of power rather than a professional system able to plan, implement and follow up. Institutional civil administration is therefore not an idealistic notion but a necessity imposed by the collapse of state mechanisms and the inability of any armed authority to rebuild a sustainable service-delivery system.
In modern states, public services rely on complex systems of planning, human-resource management, financial oversight and accountability—processes that cannot be achieved without independent civil institutions. Sudan must rebuild its civil service from the ground up by retraining personnel, modernizing regulations and reorganizing the distribution of authority between the central government and the states. Without a central planning institution capable of setting priorities, public services will continue to deteriorate regardless of funding or changes in government. Likewise, the absence of oversight mechanisms makes reconstruction efforts highly vulnerable, as institutional chaos and corruption absorb any potential progress.
This reality leads to a fundamental truth: Sudan’s economy cannot recover without adopting an institutional civil-administration model. An economy cannot function effectively under military dominance, where networks of influence control state resources and productive institutions operate based on loyalty rather than competence. Major economic sectors have turned into quasi-fiefdoms run by armed groups controlling exports, imports and illegal levies, pushing investments out of the country, accelerating capital flight and expanding an informal economy beyond the reach of the state.
Only an institutional civil model can dismantle this parallel economy and reintegrate national resources within a transparent and accountable framework. Economic development is not merely about increasing production; it is about establishing an institutional structure that ensures resources serve the state and society. For example, Sudan’s gold sector could be an immense source of foreign currency, but is currently controlled by armed groups and smuggling networks, depriving the country of its wealth. The same applies to agriculture, once the backbone of Sudan’s economy, now devastated by the absence of institutional policies, logistical infrastructure and financial stability.
Sudan needs independent financial institutions capable of shaping clear monetary policies that reduce inflation, restore confidence in the Sudanese pound and finance development instead of war. This requires ending military control over banks and productive enterprises and integrating them back into a civilian state framework. An economy cannot be run from the barracks, because the logic of war fundamentally contradicts the logic of development.
Transitioning to institutional civil governance will not be easy, as many actors benefit from ongoing chaos, and interlinked networks of interest oppose the rise of oversight systems. However, building a civil state is not impossible. It requires political and popular will aligned around new governing rules. The process can begin with drafting a transitional constitution that clearly defines the army’s role, places it under an elected civilian authority, reorganizes relations between federal and local governments, and separates the branches of power to prevent authoritarianism and ensure transparency.
A successful transition also requires rehabilitating the civil service by reinstating experienced staff, ending political and military interference and adopting a professional examination and evaluation system that guarantees merit-based recruitment and advancement. Given Sudan’s vastness and complexity, local administration must play a central role in service delivery, as long as it operates within a unified national framework subject to accountability and equipped with adequate resources.
Civil society can be a key partner in this phase by monitoring government performance, contributing to policy-making and raising public awareness about the importance of institutional governance. The private sector can also support reconstruction, provided it operates within a clear legal framework that ensures fair competition and protects investors from insecurity and illegal levies.
Institutional civil administration does not imply excluding the army, but redefining its natural role: protecting borders and sovereignty, not engaging in economic or political affairs. A professional and strong military is essential for nation-building, provided it is accountable to civilian authority and detached from economic activities.
Sudan stands today at a historic crossroads: either continue in the cycle of war and collapse or choose the path of institutional civil governance—the only path that allows the reconstruction of services, the revival of the economy and the establishment of a stable political environment capable of setting the country back on track toward development. This is not merely a change in the structure of authority but a reconstruction of an entire philosophy of governance based on citizens, transparency, accountability and the rule of law. Sudan’s future depends on the ability of its people to embrace this transition and shield their institutions from destructive political dynamics and armed violence. The road ahead is long and demanding, but it is the only one capable of restoring stability, justice and dignity to the nation.
