The emoji puzzle… the code used by Hamas reveals the secrets of the October 7 attack

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Moments before dawn on October 7, 2023, Hamas’s attack on Israel was ready, and only missing signals determined the outcome.

Hamas used a series of emojis as a code to activate Israeli SIM cards prior to the attack.

Dozens of these SIM cards were activated the night before the assault on Israeli towns on October 7, 2023, but intelligence agencies initially considered it a routine procedure, similar to other Hamas movements.

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Details:

At 9:00 p.m. on October 6, dozens of SIM cards were activated in the Gaza Strip, some of them Israeli.

The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) detected this activity and alerted military intelligence via WhatsApp, which in turn informed the Southern Command.

A preliminary discussion among intelligence officials continued until 11:30 p.m., during which it was noted that such activity occurs in Gaza every few weeks.

Later, additional indicators of “movements” within Hamas appeared. Military intelligence provided a reassuring explanation at the time, suggesting that the group feared an Israeli assassination in the following week due to a leaked cabinet meeting that had occurred days earlier.

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Other reassuring assessments suggested that elite units were conducting routine operations.

About an hour later, further unusual activity was reported, but decision-makers were told it was part of routine inspections.

Later that night, for the first time, a local malfunction in Hamas’s missile system was observed. In hindsight, it was clear that the leaders of the elite units had already deployed to secret positions near the border.

Israeli decisions that night

According to Yedioth Ahronoth, three decisions were made that night:

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• Order the air force to shorten readiness times.
• Increase the readiness of the Iron Dome in the south and recall some commanders from their bases, except for battalion leaders on weekend leave.
• Intensify aerial surveillance at dawn using two drones requested from the air force.

At 3:00 a.m., the air force received the orders and prepared to direct a reconnaissance drone and an attack drone toward Gaza by 6:00 a.m.

At the request of the Southern Command, an attack helicopter was also moved from its standby position at Ramat David to Ramon Air Base, approximately 20 minutes from Gaza.

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Minutes later, senior military intelligence officials, including the head of the Research Division, were briefed on the latest developments.

The consensus was that the information did not justify any level of alert but required heightened readiness of the forces, possibly with minor reinforcements.

A situation summary was sent to the operational phones of the military secretaries of then-Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant. No verification was done to ensure the assessment had been read by all recipients.

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The final hour before the attack

At 4:00 a.m., the only operational drone over Gaza activated its camera for the first time that night at the request of the Southern Command.

No military personnel saw or heard thousands of militants arming themselves and preparing for a coordinated attack on 117 breach points along the border.

Among the reasons, Unit 8200 had suspended its listening and surveillance capabilities against field Hamas elements well before the war.

Minutes later, Southern Command leader Brigadier General Yaron Finkelman left his home in northern Israel to manage the situation from the headquarters in Beersheba.

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At 4:30 a.m., a call took place between then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and Finkelman to discuss indicators that had not been deciphered.

According to the investigation, Halevi said: “There are no certainties, anything is possible.”

He discussed possible scenarios, such as a maritime infiltration, and instructed preparations for rapid response measures. However, no concrete operational decision was made to raise the alert level.

The Chief of the Operations Division, Brigadier General Oudid Basiuk, was informed that the Shin Bet had dispatched the “Tequila” team to the Gaza border area.

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