Power and Influence Struggles: Infighting Rocks Sudanese Army Alliances
Behind the scenes of war, internal conflicts plague the Sudanese army’s alliances—some driven by material interests, others rooted in regional tensions.
A Sudanese source in Port Sudan said rising tensions between the newly appointed Prime Minister of the army-backed government and key members of joint forces allied with the army, amid disputes over the upcoming cabinet formation in Port Sudan.
According to the source, Prime Minister Kamel Idriss faces a significant challenge in forming the new government, which army leaders intend to use to reshape their alliances with signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement from October 2020.
The Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Jibril Ibrahim have both insisted on retaining the executive positions they held during the transitional period, rights they say were guaranteed by the peace deal.
The two groups refuse to relinquish these roles, while Kamel Idriss seeks to implement the military’s directives to significantly restructure the executive branch—including ministries previously allocated to armed movements under the Juba agreement.
Jibril Ibrahim has held the post of Finance Minister since the transitional government led by Abdalla Hamdok, prior to the October 2021 military coup. Meanwhile, the Sudan Liberation Movement holds the Ministry of Minerals, led by senior figure Mohamed Bashir Abou Namo, while Minnawi serves as governor of Darfur.
Dispute Over Finance and Mining
The source said army leaders are under heavy pressure from influential Islamist figures and allied factions to seize control of the Finance and Minerals ministries, aiming to ensure full control of economic resources.
The new plan envisions placing the two ministries under direct army oversight through civilian appointees selected in consultation with Idriss.
The source attributes this strategy to the worsening economic crisis, as Port Sudan authorities struggle to keep state functions running and cover war-related expenses due to the collapse of major natural resource sectors.
With gold as the main income source, Jibril and Minnawi now wield considerable power over economic influence and decision-making in Port Sudan.
Tribal groups supporting the army in eastern, central, and northern Sudan have also expressed dissatisfaction with Jibril and Minnawi’s hold on the two ministries, particularly given the war’s erosion of the Juba agreement’s relevance.
Regional Power Struggles
The issue intensified following the defection of Sudan Shield Forces leader Abu Aqla Kikel from the Rapid Support Forces to the army. Since then, Kikel has reportedly enjoyed privileged treatment from army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, especially after his forces helped retake Al-Jazira State in January 2025.
Following that, bloody events in Kombo Tayba raised accusations of “ethnic cleansing” targeting the Kanabi community—mostly Darfuri—under claims of supporting the RSF. Sudan Shield Forces were blamed, though Kikel denied involvement.
In response, Jibril and Minnawi’s movements expressed solidarity with the Kanabi and pledged to protect them from such violence.
Despite Kikel’s denials, tension remains between him and the armed groups. According to reports, Minnawi left a recent cabinet meeting chaired by Kamel Idriss as soon as he noticed Kikel’s presence.
Other Juba peace signatories—such as Central Track, the Northern Entity, Kikel’s forces, and some eastern Sudanese groups—have voiced objections to Jibril and Minnawi’s insistence on keeping their ministerial posts, possibly due to shifting regional alliances amid the war.
On Tuesday, the Justice and Equality Movement, headed by Jibril Ibrahim, reaffirmed its full commitment to the Juba Peace Agreement, including its ministerial entitlements.
