Policy

Al-Sadr Wields the Street Card and Election Boycott in Response to the Coordination Framework Offer


A source confirmed that Moqtada al-Sadr has proposed either returning to the streets with demonstrations or implicitly accepting the elections while directing his supporters to boycott them, or even pushing for a complete postponement of the vote by betting on regional developments.

The leader of the Sadrist movement, Moqtada al-Sadr, rejected an offer presented by the Coordination Framework, which aimed to ease political tensions and guarantee al-Sadr’s participation in the electoral process, according to informed political sources. This refusal marks a notable development, reflecting the challenges that the upcoming elections pose to the Iraqi political landscape.

The source, who wished to remain anonymous and spoke to the Kurdish Iraqi outlet Shafaq News, stated that a special envoy from the Coordination Framework recently met with al-Sadr carrying a proposal that would grant the Sadrist movement the freedom to name the next Prime Minister, provided it refrains from interfering in electoral details or contesting the results. While the offer represented an attempt to contain escalating tensions, al-Sadr rejected it outright.

Instead, al-Sadr presented three main options for handling the upcoming phase, all reflecting an increasingly cautious and hardline stance, highlighting the significant challenges the Sadrist movement faces in a tense political environment, even as the leader had previously rejected any attempt to obstruct the electoral process.

The first option considered by the leader is a return to the streets, launching a new wave of popular protests that could include sit-in tents and escalation, potentially obstructing the entire electoral process and even threatening to derail the democratic process if urgent agreements are not reached.

Although his movement has already withdrawn from Parliament and the electoral race, this option allows him to remain highly influential on the street, particularly given his ability to mobilize a large and impactful base, as seen in previous years’ protests.

The second option involves implicit acceptance of the elections in principle, while directing his supporters to boycott them. This scenario may appear calm on the surface but carries a major risk for the political process, as it could result in extremely low turnout, undermining the popular legitimacy of the elections, especially if controversial armed forces participate.

According to the source, al-Sadr bets that low voter turnout may lead international actors to refuse recognition of the results, paving the way for the formation of a transitional emergency government, similar to Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s previous administration.

The third option involves pushing for a full postponement of the elections, whether by raising technical issues, demanding additional political guarantees, or betting on unexpected regional developments that might force the government and the Coordination Framework to revise the current timeline.

This possibility reflects a deeper understanding within the Sadrist movement of the intertwined nature of regional conflicts, particularly the escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, developments in the Syrian dossier, and fluctuations in Baghdad-Erbil relations.

Sources close to the movement indicate that al-Sadr now makes decisions within a very small circle of close advisors. This isolation reflects a temporary strategic retreat aimed at avoiding political exhaustion, while simultaneously weakening communication channels with other political blocs and complicating the prospects for compromise.

Recent statements and tweets from al-Sadr show a greater focus on addressing his popular base directly, bypassing traditional political channels, reinforcing his opponents’ sense that he maintains initiative outside official institutions.

The recent political crisis intensified following leaks of a plot to assassinate al-Sadr, attributed to MP Yasser Al-Maliki of the State of Law Coalition, via a drone during a potential visit to his father’s shrine in Najaf.

Although the MP quickly denied the allegations, tensions on the ground escalated as members of the Saraya al-Salam, the Sadrist movement’s armed wing, deployed in Basra, raising security concerns ahead of the elections.

In a tweet described as an “early warning,” al-Sadr noted that the country is heading toward a dangerous escalation by “power lovers and chair enthusiasts,” affirming that the Sadrist movement “will not be dragged into fitna,” relying on his supporters’ awareness.

In a statement two days ago, he noted that “non-participation has increased voters’ fears and speculation about potential scenarios,” responding to rumors that “the Shiite movement” would forcibly prevent access to polling stations or provoke unrest to sabotage the elections, or mobilize its massive base to protest in the streets to block the vote.

A source close to al-Sadr described this message as an implicit declaration that the movement will not allow the reproduction of consensus politics and power-sharing, nor accept marginalization on the political map, even if outside Parliament.

Al-Sadr clearly presents two options: either a national majority government reflecting the voters’ will, or an active opposition capable of influencing events from the streets, not from political courtesy halls.

The upcoming elections, therefore, do not appear to be a mere constitutional exercise but a decisive moment that will shape Iraq’s political landscape for the coming years. With intensifying conflicts among Shiite forces and increasing signs of regional and international interference, the results may not only reflect the parliamentary balance of power but also the future of the Sadrist movement and Moqtada al-Sadr’s position in the equation of governance.

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