Middle east

Gaza and the “Mowing the Grass” Strategy: Can Hamas Rebuild Itself?


Amidst the rubble of Gaza, critical questions arise about the future of the conflict. Will Hamas be able to rebuild its strength? And can the region emerge from destruction into lasting peace?

According to Foreign Policy, the short answer is grim: “On its current trajectory, Hamas is likely to rebuild itself, Gaza will remain in ruins, and achieving a lasting peaceful settlement will be nearly impossible.”

Rebuilding Hamas

The American magazine explains that on the eve of the October 7, 2023, attack, Hamas resembled a quasi-military force, with between 25,000 and 30,000 fighters organized into five regional brigades, 24 battalions, and various specialized units, including air, naval, and special operations forces.

Hamas also had an arsenal of up to 30,000 rockets, making it larger than the armies of some European nations, according to Foreign Policy.

The October 7 attack itself was carried out in a manner more akin to a conventional military assault, complete with covert objectives and battalion-level operations, rather than the kind of attack typically expected from a militant group.

Hamas After October 7

However, after nearly 16 months of fighting, Hamas has suffered severe losses.

The Israeli military estimates that it has eliminated between 17,000 and 20,000 Hamas fighters in the war so far.

Many senior Hamas leaders have been killed, including Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas‘ political bureau; Mohammed Deif, the commander of the Qassam Brigades; and his deputy, Marwan Issa.

Most notably, Yahya Sinwar, Haniyeh’s successor and the man Israel considers the mastermind of the October 7 attack, remains a key target.

Additionally, Israeli military operations have severely weakened Hamas‘ mid-level leadership, killing eight brigade commanders, 30 battalion commanders, and 165 company commanders.

According to Foreign Policy, this depletion of operational and tactical leadership means Hamas is unlikely to be able to launch another large-scale coordinated attack like the one on October 7.

But…

Despite these losses, Israel has not yet succeeded in dismantling Hamas as an organization.

The fact that Hamas negotiators in Qatar have been able to engage in deal-making, identify the hostages they still hold, and release them in an organized manner suggests that the movement’s leadership and control structures have been heavily hit but remain functional.

With a ceasefire in place and renewed freedom of movement within Gaza, any broken links in Hamas‘ chain of command are likely to be restored.

As a result, in the absence of an Israeli strategy to consolidate its military gains, Hamas is expected to regroup.

U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that Hamas has recruited approximately 15,000 new fighters during the conflict.

While these recruits are unlikely to match the experience of their predecessors, some of the gap in expertise may be filled by Palestinian prisoners released by Israel as part of hostage exchange deals.

During the initial phase of the ceasefire, Israel agreed to release over 1,900 Palestinian prisoners.

It is expected that freeing the remaining 59 hostages will involve the release of a similar number of Palestinian detainees.

According to Foreign Policy, if Israel cannot prevent Hamas from replenishing its ranks, it may resort to imposing even stricter security measures on Gaza—an approach the magazine describes as problematic given the region’s current state of devastation.

The Challenge of Rebuilding Gaza

The United Nations reports that more than 1.8 million people in Gaza are in need of shelter and that 170,000 buildings—nearly 70% of all pre-war structures—have been damaged or destroyed.

The UN estimates that rebuilding Gaza could take at least 15 years, while U.S. assessments suggest the process would require at least 10-15 years.

However, these projections assume that Israel will allow the importation of construction materials, which is far from guaranteed.

Israel considers many building materials to have dual-use potential. Concrete and steel, necessary for reconstructing homes and hospitals, could also be used to rebuild Hamas‘ tunnel network.

Similarly, Gaza needs excavation equipment to remove approximately 50 million tons of rubble, but such machinery could also be used for tunneling operations, Foreign Policy notes.

Moreover, U.S. estimates suggest that 30,000 unexploded ordnance devices remain in Gaza, posing both a civilian hazard and a potential resource for Hamas to harvest explosive materials for future attacks.

The Hamas Tunnel Network

Another critical factor is Hamas‘ extensive underground tunnel system, which stretches between 350 and 450 miles across Gaza.

Israel has previously claimed to have destroyed about 80% of the tunnels in Rafah and 85% of those in Khan Younis. However, other reports indicate that large portions of the network remain intact.

Even if Israel’s 80% figure is accurate, Hamas would still retain dozens of tunnels for smuggling and storing weapons.

All of this suggests that, after a ceasefire agreement, Hamas is likely to retain the personnel, infrastructure, and weaponry necessary to continue functioning as a significant military force in Gaza.

This, in turn, will have far-reaching consequences. If Hamas remains operational, it will be difficult to exclude the group from having a say in Gaza’s governance—something Israel, the U.S., and other countries have insisted on.

In this context, Foreign Policy poses a critical question: Without a security guarantor, who would be willing to finance Gaza’s reconstruction, a process estimated to cost over $50 billion?

The “Mowing the Grass” Strategy

On the Israeli side, a significant majority of the population reportedly prefers a second phase of the hostage deal with Hamas over resuming the war.

At the same time, similar proportions of Israelis oppose any form of a two-state solution or believe that lasting peace can be achieved.

As a result, the real question on the current trajectory is not whether another war in Gaza will occur—but when.

If that prospect weren’t grim enough, wars in Gaza have become progressively longer and bloodier. This suggests that the next war in the region could be even more devastating than the current one.

Israeli strategists refer to this dynamic as the “mowing the grass” approach—where Hamas launches attacks, Israel weakens the group, and then the threat gradually regrows.

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