Israeli female unit spying deep inside Syria… Secrets of Site 720
Despite US-led talks, in cooperation with Israel, aimed at improving relations with Syria, an Israeli army officer suggests that his country has no intention of leaving Syria anytime soon.
To counter what it describes as threats to its forces in Syria, a female field-intelligence unit of the Israeli army operates inside Syrian territory.
The Jerusalem Post recently accompanied a group of female field-intelligence soldiers “who spy on hostile elements in Syria”. The newspaper reported visits to several “sensitive” sites, including “Site 720”, located at the tri-border area between Israel, Syria and Jordan.
A female intelligence unit
The paper interviewed the commander of Battalion 595, Lieutenant Colonel J, the operations officer Major M, and intelligence soldiers S, D and F — all women except for J — to present a detailed view of how incursions into Syrian territory are carried out.
The three soldiers — S, D and F — specialise in gathering field intelligence using drones.
Major M explained that the use of drones has greatly expanded since the 2023-2025 war. Now, every platoon commander, and sometimes individual soldiers, has a personal drone for frontline intelligence collection.
J noted that one of the main skills involved is determining the optimal altitude for drone flights under varying conditions.
“Ideally, you fly as low as possible to obtain accurate information and high-resolution monitoring, but flying too low can reveal the surveillance, alert the targets, and enable them to evade detection, thereby compromising covert intelligence gathering,” J said.
Battalion 595 has helped identify and pursue Iranians, Hamas members, and “anyone who may threaten Israel in or near the Syrian area,” according to the Jerusalem Post.
S did not expect to become a combat soldier and field-intelligence officer. At the time of the interview, she had been serving for two and a half years.
Secrets of Site 720
Before the Israeli “invasion” of Syria in December 2024 and the establishment of a buffer zone, she had spent extended periods on Syrian soil, although not deep inside due to the absence of Israeli bases in the area.
After the “invasion”, she spent long periods near Site 720, close to the Israeli-Syrian-Jordanian border triangle.
When the Alexandroni Brigade carried out operations in the area, they always relied on the intelligence provided by S and her unit, and their directives guided the operations directly.
In one mission, S said they advanced several kilometres beyond the buffer zone to provide field guidance to Paratroopers Battalion 890.
In another, they monitored four individuals linked to Iran or its affiliates, with each soldier analysing the movements, timing and routines of one person individually.
Soldier D
D explained that their operations are mostly conducted at night to avoid detection and reduce the risks of clashes with “hostile elements”. They study in detail who enters and leaves each building they are tasked with monitoring.
In one mission, they spent four hours preparing an ambush for a high-value target and briefed a large group of soldiers on how to prevent any escape attempt.
Soldier F
F, who had been serving for two years and two months, participated in assisting Israeli forces in securing new areas within the buffer zone in Syria on December 8.
She also described an operation carried out several kilometres deep inside Syrian territory, in which she worked alongside paratroopers in major operations.
Last July, the Israeli army acknowledged its failure to prevent a large number of Israeli Druze from crossing into Syrian territory. However, J and other senior officers said the police should lead such complex situations involving Israeli civilians.
M added that gathering intelligence on Druze communities and the region of Sweida is essential to keeping the Israeli army ahead and avoiding unpleasant surprises, as happened before.
Countering threats
Asked how arrest or attack orders against Iranian elements near the border or the buffer zone are issued, J said several factors are considered: knowing when the target is alone or surrounded by people who could complicate the mission, understanding the daily routine of the village where the target lives, and identifying the vehicles and their users.
J noted that mission priorities — arrest or elimination — are generally set by higher-ranking officers, but if the mission becomes complex, he may adjust the parameters.
He described an operation in Syria where he set up a mobile command centre close to the front lines to facilitate direct oversight and mission management.
