The Burden of the Muslim Brotherhood: Yemen’s Al-Islah Desperately Tries to Dissociate from the Group
Following the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood’s regional and international influence, numerous political parties and structures are seeking to distance themselves from the burden of association with the group, and Yemen is no exception.
Al-Islah, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, continues to employ opportunistic tactics aimed at reshaping its stereotypical image, hoping to maintain its influence on the national political scene.
As the organization marks its 35th anniversary this year, it presents itself under a new guise intended to appeal abroad by denying any organizational link to the Brotherhood, thereby conferring a “national” image to a party whose ideological, financial, media, and political extensions remain closely tied to the international Brotherhood network.
Domestically, Al-Islah’s traditional methods continue to dominate. Its recent initiative proposing a “political honor charter” reflects deep concerns within the organization over declining popularity and the risk, after the end of the Houthi coup, of suffering a “fatal” blow backed by the international community.
A Brotherhood Condition to End the Coup
In this context, Al-Islah leader Mohammed al-Yadomi, speaking from his voluntary exile on the anniversary of the organization’s founding (September 13, 1990), called for the adoption of a “political honor charter stipulating that the country would be governed through partnership and consensus for several years following the fall of the Houthi coup, until the nation regains stability, after which general elections would be held within the framework of a comprehensive political consensus.”
Observers see this initiative as merely “a new condition imposed by the organization to end the Houthi coup” and a “tactic” through which Al-Islah seeks to restore its public image and place its cadres in key positions to ensure presence and control.
Experts assert that Al-Islah continues to “play a role as part of the problem rather than part of the solution,” turning its political initiatives into a façade to conceal practices effectively aimed at controlling state levers via its political, media, networks, associations, and branches.
Moreover, its calls for governance by partnership rather than elections reflect the leadership’s deep conviction that participating in the electoral process would remove the group from the scene following its declining popularity and the collapse of its narrative since the 2011 chaos.
One Basket
Al-Yadomi also asserted that “Al-Islah is a Yemeni civil party, rooted in the country and its affiliations, with no organizational connection, near or distant, to any party or group abroad, including the Muslim Brotherhood organization.”
Commenting on this statement, Yemeni religious affairs expert Saeed Bakran noted that “al-Yadomi’s claims denying organizational links with the international Brotherhood are neither new nor original, but a recurring form of political misrepresentation.”
Bakran explained that “Hamas had already, in 2017, issued a document declaring its organizational dissociation from the mother organization, followed by Tunisia’s Ennahdha movement under Rached Ghannouchi, which declared that it had no ties to the international Brotherhood network.”
Bakran emphasized that “these misrepresentations fail against the reality that the leader of Yemen’s Brotherhood cannot deny what matters more than organizational links: the transnational ideological, intellectual, media, political, and financial ties.”
He added that “the separation of organizational links among global branches was a strategic and security decision serving the international organization’s interests, granting branches artificial national colors and preventing security risks in countries where external organizational ties could justify lethal strikes against the group.”
Bakran pointed out that “the international organization operates under the principle of not putting all its eggs in one basket to avoid total destruction from a single blow—a strategy focusing on risk distribution to safeguard the core project in case of failure.”
Partnership
Regarding the partnership demanded by the Brotherhood, Bakran explained that it “sends a message to international, regional, and national actors: we will not act and will not allow action against the Houthis unless our share of power is guaranteed following or alongside such action.”
Choosing partnership “instead of elections” likely reflects the leadership’s belief that participating in elections would mean the group’s removal from the scene following the severe damage to its popularity and the collapse of its Islamic narrative due to power struggles since 2011.
Political activist Anas al-Khalidi stated that the Muslim Brotherhood “was never a state project, but a tool to dismantle it; it never carried a national agenda but served as the spearhead in undermining state institutions and law, and the main driver of internal conflicts that tore apart national cohesion.”
He added that Al-Islah has become “a compliant instrument serving foreign agendas at the expense of republican sovereignty and the Yemeni people’s interest, methodically working to transform division into strategy and opportunism into a governance model, to the point that the nation is deeply detached from itself and subject to contradictions not of its making.”
