Ignoring the Muslim Brotherhood… a strategic mistake undermining Western approaches to ending the war in Sudan
Many Western approaches to the war in Sudan remain trapped in a simplistic reading that reduces the conflict to a military confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces.
However, an analysis published by the American magazine National Interest argues that this perception not only overlooks the deep roots of the crisis but also contributes to its prolongation by ignoring the structural role played by the Muslim Brotherhood within the system of governance.
According to the magazine, the ongoing war is not merely a power struggle between two military formations, but rather a new episode in a long process through which the Muslim Brotherhood has sought to re-establish its influence within Sudanese state institutions, to the point where it has effectively become part of the ruling system rather than a mere tactical ally.
Mobilization rhetoric and the sabotage of settlements
Politically, National Interest points out that forces associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, through their media platforms and party arms, have worked to portray the war as an existential battle, systematically rejecting any calls for a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement. In this context, civilian forces and international mediators have been demonized and accused of acting in accordance with foreign agendas.
This discourse, according to the magazine, has served both sides in this equation: it has provided al-Burhan with ideological cover and a domestic mobilization base, while offering the Muslim Brotherhood political and security protection that reopened the door for their repositioning within state institutions.
The magazine stresses that the relationship between the two sides has gone beyond tactical alliance to take on the character of structural integration.
The 1990s experience… a reproduced model
The American magazine recalls Sudan’s experience in the 1990s, when the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood within the state transformed the country into an open platform for transnational terrorist organizations.
During that period, Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden, leader of al-Qaeda, between 1991 and 1996, granting him freedom of movement and protection, and also sheltered members of Hamas and networks linked to it, under the direct patronage of influential Brotherhood leaders.
Sudan also played the role of a logistical corridor for arms smuggling to Gaza, including Iranian shipments that passed through Sudanese territory, leading to Israeli strikes inside the country.
National Interest considers that these activities were neither marginal nor incidental, but rather part of the way the state was managed at the time, with sovereignty being instrumentalized to serve terrorist networks and regional alliances.
Convergence of interests with Iran
The magazine notes that the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran represents one of the key elements in understanding the group’s return to the scene. Despite doctrinal differences, this cooperation was based on shared interests: Iran benefited from a geographical corridor expanding its regional influence, while the Muslim Brotherhood obtained weapons, support, and resources.
National Interest asserts that this model is being reproduced today under al-Burhan’s rule, with the reactivation of the Brotherhood’s regional networks and the consolidation of their presence within the military and security apparatus, which explains the failure of diplomatic initiatives and the obstruction of any serious path toward civilian rule.
Deferred transition and a troubled regime
According to the analysis, any genuine civilian transition in Sudan requires dismantling the structure that the Muslim Brotherhood has rebuilt within the state, a step the current regime cannot take without threatening its own political and military cohesion. Hence, the transition remains deliberately postponed, not due to mismanagement, but as a conscious choice to preserve existing power balances.
The American magazine concludes that treating a regime with organizational roots linked to a history of hosting al-Qaeda, supporting Hamas, and coordinating with Iran as a partner for stability constitutes a strategic error. A realistic approach, it argues, is not based on accommodation but on confrontation, containment, and neutralization of this model.
The core of the crisis
The war in Sudan may appear to be a clash between two military sides, but its essence, the magazine concludes, lies in the deep penetration of the Muslim Brotherhood at the heart of the system.
As long as this reality persists, peace will remain a distant prospect, not because of the complexity of the scene, but due to a deliberate political design to keep the state hostage to conflict.
