A Strategic Shift in Political Islam: From a Transnational Project to Integration Within the State
Recent intellectual and political developments within Islamist movements — particularly those connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and its various branches — have led to a noticeable transformation in their structures and priorities. These movements have gradually begun to abandon their longstanding ambition of building a cross-border political project, moving instead toward what can be described as a form of national pragmatism focused on operating within state frameworks, according to an analysis published by Amad Media.
In an analytical report published by Amad, commentators argue that movements associated with political Islam — including the jihadist current that once promoted a sweeping global vision aimed at reshaping the international order — no longer represent the dominant or most influential model. The experiences of groups that attempted to entrench similar visions internationally have demonstrated the limits of their success and, in many cases, exposed them to widespread public rejection as well as coordinated security and legal responses from multiple states.
The report suggests that this shift is not merely a temporary tactical adjustment, but rather a fundamental transformation in the priorities of political Islam itself. It now tends to favor operating within the nation-state and managing its affairs, rather than directly confronting the international system. This evolution aligns with significant political shifts seen in countries such as Afghanistan and Syria, where authorities linked to Islamist movements have avoided returning to the rhetoric of “global jihad,” instead focusing on survival, consolidation of power, and state administration.
The analysis further notes that this new pragmatism departs from the ambitions once fueled by groups such as al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, which sought to create supranational political or ideological entities. This change is attributed to the high costs of direct confrontation with global systems, the failure to produce persuasive and successful models of governance, and the moral shock generated by extremist practices in some regions.
This retreat, however, does not mean that Islamist-oriented movements have disappeared or lost relevance. The key difference is that those which remain have recognized the need to adapt to the logic of the modern state, abandoning narratives of total confrontation. This may help explain the decline of the idea of a “global caliphate” and the shift toward more achievable, locally focused demands within legal and institutional frameworks.
These developments call for careful scrutiny by policymakers in the region. Understanding them requires new political and social tools, and suggests that the future landscape of political Islam will be more closely tied to domestic politics and less to cross-border agendas — potentially reshaping the security and ideological dynamics surrounding these movements.
