The Army and the Islamists: A Convergence of Interests Threatening Sudan’s Civilian Transition

On July 25, 2025, Reuters reopened the file on the return of Islamists in Sudan, affirming that the Islamic movement affiliated with Omar al-Bashir’s regime is seeking to regain its influence through an alliance with the army, banking on a prolonged transitional period followed by elections that could restore them to power. Ahmed Haroun, wanted by the International Criminal Court and head of the now-dissolved National Congress Party, made statements aligning with this strategy. This development comes as a war that erupted in April 2023 continues to rage, producing one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises today.
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In this article, we analyze the Islamists’ motivations, the military’s calculations, the regional alignments (the Iran–Turkey–Qatar axis versus anti-political Islam powers), and the implications for civilian forces and the prospects of any democratic transition. We will also explore possible scenarios and the options available to local, regional, and international actors.
Why Are the Islamists Betting on the Army Now?
A Vacuum of Political Legitimacy:
The war has severely weakened civilian institutions and pushed political parties and unions to the margins. This has created space for the Islamists’ old networks in the state, security apparatus, and economy to re-emerge under the guise of “state protection” alongside the army.
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Organizational Experience:
The Islamic movement and figures from al-Bashir’s regime have accumulated over three decades of experience in “governing from behind the scenes,” allowing them to swiftly adapt to the realities of war and a parallel economy.
Funding and Weapons:
Reuters and other sources report that influential Islamist figures have reactivated old channels with Iran, Turkey, and Qatar to secure weapons and logistical support for the army, reshaping the map of regional alliances within Sudan.
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The “Postponed Elections” Strategy:
Ahmed Haroun presents a clear model: a lengthy military-led transitional period culminating in elections that could bring the Islamists back to power through the ballot box, amid a fragmented security, political, and economic environment.
The Army and the Islamic Movement: Convergence of Interests or Temporary Alliance?
Officially, the military leadership denies the existence of a political alliance. However, growing indicators — from government appointments to direct combat roles — suggest an increasing Islamist presence in decision-making centers and front lines. This is more a convergence of interests than an ideological alliance: the army needs an organizational machine, funding, and experienced state actors to fill the vacuum, while the Islamists need a security umbrella that enables their gradual return.
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Yet this convergence is fraught with risk. The deeper the Islamists penetrate state structures, the slimmer the chances of reaching an inclusive political settlement, and the more complicated any future negotiations with civilian forces or international stakeholders, who insist on a transition toward civilian rule.
Regional Dimension: The Iran–Turkey–Qatar Axis vs. the Anti-Political Islam Bloc
According to Reuters and other reports, Islamists are relying on support channels with Iran, Turkey, and Qatar to strengthen the army militarily. This alignment could further deepen regional polarization within Sudan.
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Conversely, the United Arab Emirates has historically taken a firm stance against the return of Islamists to power and has viewed the democratic transition as an opportunity to reduce their influence. Multiple Reuters reports since 2019 have emphasized that this approach is not rooted in hostility toward Sudan, but in a broader regional vision that sees political Islam as a source of instability.
Relations between the Sudanese army and the UAE deteriorated this year, culminating in the army’s Defense Council announcing on May 6, 2025, its intention to sever ties with the UAE.
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Internal Impact: Deeper Divisions, Weaker Legitimacy
Even a partial return of the Islamists deepens the divide between military and civilian camps and puts pressure on revolutionary forces, which view the Islamists as a continuation of an era of repression and domination. It also complicates the negotiating landscape with the international community. Meanwhile, the war continues to tear the country apart: over 12 million people displaced and half the population facing acute hunger, according to recent UN estimates.
What Does This Mean for Civilian Forces?
Renewing the Narrative for the Current Phase:
Slogans like “No to Military Rule” are no longer sufficient. A realistic socio-economic contract must be formulated to convince exhausted sectors that a viable civilian alternative is not only possible but ready to govern.
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Unifying the Civilian–Armed Front:
The divisions among civilian forces and their conflicting regional ties give Islamists and the army a golden opportunity. What’s needed is a unified political initiative — even at a minimum — around the state’s form, security arrangements, transitional justice, and decentralization.
An Early Electoral Strategy:
If the likely scenario is elections after a prolonged war and a military-led transition, civilian forces must begin now to build organizational bases and a compelling narrative to counter the Islamists’ superior mobilization.
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UAE’s Calculations: Strategic Consistency and Realpolitik
The UAE’s approach to the Sudanese scene appears rooted in consistent strategic principles: resisting the expansion of political Islam, supporting stable civilian transitions, and minimizing the chaos affecting the Red Sea, trade routes, and energy corridors. Any rhetorical escalation from official Khartoum will likely not alter these fundamentals but may complicate communication channels and increase the need for regional and international mediation to reduce misunderstandings and prevent broader internationalization of the conflict.
Possible Scenarios
Entrenched Military-Islamist Rule:
The war drags on, superficial transitional institutions are established, and elections are held in an environment marked by unequal access to resources, organization, and media — facilitating the Islamists’ return via the ballot box. This could spark confrontation with regional and international powers and reduce chances for economic and financial support.
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Regionally Backed Settlement Excluding Islamists:
Regional/international pressure succeeds in imposing a civilian-led transitional path, curbing the Islamists’ influence within state institutions, and carefully integrating military elements within a reformed security framework. This scenario requires consensus among fragmented civilian forces and support from regional powers opposed to Islamist resurgence.
Multi-Centered Fragmentation:
The war persists, humanitarian crises worsen, and Sudan becomes a mosaic of military and political enclaves, weakening any group’s grip — including the Islamists — on the central state. This opens the door to internationalization of the conflict and further economic collapse.
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What Should International and Regional Mediators Do?
- Link all economic and humanitarian support to a clearly phased political process: ceasefire, humanitarian arrangements, security sector reform, civilian transition, then elections.
- Broaden the base of mediation to include the African Union, IGAD, and influential Arab actors, to reduce the fragmentation of platforms and conflicting initiatives.
- Pressure all parties to stop foreign arms transfers, as they prolong the war and deepen regional polarization within Sudan.
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Reuters’ latest report does more than describe the familiar reality of Islamists attempting a comeback through the army — it points directly to the formula now governing Sudan: a protracted war hollowing out politics, an army seeking alternative legitimacy, an Islamist movement betting on organization and postponed elections, and a global community engaging with Sudan through the lenses of counterterrorism, trade route protection, and containment of cross-border chaos.
The key question remains: Do civilian forces — backed by regional actors supporting democratic transition — possess the realism and flexibility to forge a path that prevents Sudan from regressing to the pre-2019 era? The answer will hinge on how quickly the war ends, how the security sector is restructured, and how well the political process can be shielded from the dominance of arms and ideological organizations — whatever their color.