Sudanese Army Fully Subdued by the Muslim Brotherhood
The increased visibility of leaders and brigades of the Muslim Brotherhood, both military and political, in the hours following the Sudanese army‘s reclaiming of the radio and television headquarters in central Omdurman, raised numerous questions about the implications and timing of the event.
Commander of the “Al Baraa” brigade, Al Musbah Abou Zeid, appeared announcing “victory” moments after the army entered the headquarters, which had been under the control of the Rapid Support Forces since the early weeks of the April conflict.
On the other hand, media platforms affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood were active in glorifying the role of what they termed “fighters and Islamic movement cadres” in the fighting. Some platforms went even further, considering this step as the beginning of the organization’s return to power and the end of any role for political parties that led the change, which ousted the Brotherhood‘s regime in April 2019 after three decades.
The third aspect of this public appearance is found in statements attributed to the Secretary-General of the Islamic movement, Ali Karti, where he clearly stated a refusal to yield to any ceasefire or negotiated solutions.
Some have linked this visibility to the current composition of the army amidst the widening war, which has encompassed over 70% of the country’s territory so far, with armed movements joining the fight alongside the army.
Writer Sabah Mohammed Al Hassan believed that the intense media presence of the Al Baraa brigade commander aimed at presenting himself and “achieving gains by announcing the recovery of a site with emotional value for the Sudanese people, and psychological value for Muslim Brotherhood elements as a platform to broadcast all coup-related statements that make them feel powerful.”
The rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s dominance within Sudanese military circles has intensified, with a large number of officers participating, understanding that their fate is either elimination or imprisonment if leaders supportive of the Islamic movement or the ousted regime discover their orientations.
According to confidential sources, information about the growing opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood within the army has reached the leaders, prompting military intelligence agencies to interrogate dozens and investigate many officers to identify opponents and exclude them from the scene.
A senior officer in the Sudanese army revealed that some members of the armed forces had long warned against the danger of associating the army’s name with militias that may have connections with globally condemned terrorist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
The same officer, who preferred to remain anonymous, added that the involvement of these elements in combat alongside the army is coordinated at the highest level with influential political leaders within the army and security forces like Ali Karti, Ahmed Haroun, and others.
A former Sudanese army officer, Walid El Toma, stated that the organization had failed to change the ideology of all army members, evidenced by the fact that the ousted president, Omar al-Bashir, mistrusted the army until his fall.
The army had foiled a military coup about a month ago, prepared by a number of officers opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood‘s dominance over the armed forces.
Sources had then reported that army intelligence services had arrested several officers in the Wadi Seidna military area in Omdurman for “preparing a coup,” according to the Al-Sudani newspaper.
The organization sought to create centers of power within the army and succeeded in corrupting some to pave the way for its elements to control specific sectors. It now effectively controls decisions of the armed forces, whether on the battlefield or even on political matters concerning negotiations to end the war.
Since the early 1990s, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the army has greatly increased, as they began using religious and extremist slogans to appeal to the sentiments of youth and involve them in the civil war in the Nuba Mountains and the predominantly Christian South, which separated in 2011 to form its independent state.
Return Strategy
Since the fall of their regime in April 2019, the Muslim Brotherhood has employed three tools to pave the way for their return to power, relying on an extensive network of financial, media, and military influence they have built over the past three decades.
Since their emergence in the form of small and limited networks in the late 1940s, the organization has worked on expanding its base within the army and security apparatus to achieve its ambitions of accessing power. Indeed, these networks were used to execute the first coup attempt in 1959, just three years after the country gained independence from British rule in 1956. These attempts persisted until 1989, when the organization successfully executed a coup against Omar al-Bashir, who ruled the country for 30 years.
However, since the early 1990s, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudanese army has significantly increased, as they began to use religious and extremist slogans to appeal to youth and involve them in the civil war in the Nuba Mountains and the predominantly Christian South, which separated in 2011 to form its independent state.
The organization sought to establish centers of power within the army, but Walid El Toma, a former Sudanese army officer, said that the organization succeeded in infiltrating the army but failed to change the ideology of all its members.
On the media front, the organization is currently utilizing vast media networks encompassing several websites and television channels, in addition to investing enormous sums in companies and groups specialized in spreading rumors and fake news on social media to tarnish the image of civilians and influence public opinion.
War Persistence
The Muslim Brotherhood brigades, fighting alongside the army, exert strong pressure for the continuation of war and reject any peaceful compromise, amid reports of a cell affiliated with the organization behind extremist positions opposed to a ceasefire. The Brotherhood groups openly link their support to the army with the continuation of the war.
In this context, political analyst Mohammed Latif states: “The army is just a tool to execute their programs; whenever it deviates from that, they fight it and seek another replacement army.”
The Al Baraa brigade vehemently rejected local, regional, and international efforts to end the war. Observers believe that this refusal is linked to the principle of violence on which the brigade and other jihadist groups rely, highlighting their clear connection to the Islamic State organization, which has embarrassed the army’s position.
According to a senior officer, some army officers have long warned against the danger of associating the army’s name with militias that may have connections with globally condemned terrorist organizations. However, the officer, who preferred to remain anonymous, clarified that “the involvement of these elements in combat alongside the army is done at a high level of coordination with influential political leaders within the army and security forces such as Ali Karti, Ahmed Haroun, and others.”
