Three Years After 7 October: What Has Changed in the Israeli Military?
The Hebrew-language Israeli website Walla has published a report examining the changes introduced by the Israeli military following the 7 October 2023 attack. It says the Military Intelligence Directorate, Aman, has revised its early-warning doctrine, while the air force has strengthened its readiness and military commands have redefined their approach to defence.
According to the report, the Israeli military released information on Wednesday about its activities across the different fronts, three years after the outbreak of the “Swords of Iron” war. It also addressed personnel levels and the implementation of lessons learned from 7 October across its branches, commands, units and departments.
Walla argues that the military is seeking to demonstrate a fundamental transformation, particularly since Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir took office in March 2025. However, the information released did not address a comprehensive change in institutional military culture, which the report identifies as one of the factors behind “the greatest catastrophe” in Israel’s history since its establishment.
The Military Intelligence Directorate
According to Walla, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Major General Shlomi Binder, has undertaken extensive changes within an organisation shaken more severely than at any time since the failures of the October 1973 war.
The main task, the report says, was to restore confidence in the directorate and prepare it to handle different challenges. Binder placed early warning of war, hostile activity, threats or developments that could endanger Israel and its citizens at the top of his reform priorities.
He also established four guiding principles: responsibility, professionalism, humility and truth.
Over the past two years, the operational warning doctrine has been updated, existing warning models reassessed and new models developed. Warning centres have been strengthened at different levels and across all fronts, while advanced training programmes have been introduced within the directorate’s training framework, according to the report.
Walla adds that steps have been taken to address “signals from the ground” comprehensively. These include establishing a multidisciplinary intelligence warning centre covering multiple fronts, designed to produce a unified intelligence picture grounded in operational realities.
The report presents Binder as the only official to place substantial emphasis on fundamentally changing intelligence culture and processes. His approach puts the challenges of surprise and uncertainty at the centre of institutional and everyday thinking, promotes critical and sceptical analysis, and encourages questioning of the directorate’s own assumptions and internal debate.
Binder also decided to adopt a warning doctrine and professional methods capable of detecting changes in enemy preparations, while reducing the weight assigned to assessments of enemy intentions and what the report describes as “reassuring signals”.
This included rebuilding warning models based on “indicative signs”, intended to provide a common language for operational commanders, intelligence analysts and information-gathering agencies.
The oversight department was re-established with an expanded remit to systematically challenge the directorate’s assumptions and assessments. At the same time, the Midrasha, an institution dedicated to training intelligence leaders, was created.
A new technological unit is also being established within the Military Intelligence Directorate to centralise and process information and knowledge.
The unit forms part of efforts to adapt to future challenges. It will develop intelligence working methods and maximise the use of institutional information through advanced integration of computing infrastructure, data and artificial intelligence technologies.
Southern Command
Within Southern Command, the information presented to the General Staff focused on eliminating the command chain and fighters who participated in the 7 October attack, through cooperation between the air force, Military Intelligence Directorate and Operations Directorate.
According to the figures, four leaders of Hamas’s military wing, 17 brigade commanders, around 60 battalion commanders and approximately 300 company commanders were killed during the war.
The report nevertheless notes that senior Israeli security officials recognise that the approach implemented so far, including what is known as the “yellow line”, will not defeat Hamas. The movement continues to prepare for further fighting against Israel.
Infrastructure and protective measures for settlements and communities have also been upgraded, alongside stronger emergency response capabilities and preparedness.
Along the “yellow line”, which faces significant challenges from Hamas, around 40 military posts have been established at commanding positions. The fence, which was breached at more than 60 points, has undergone repairs and upgrades.
According to the released information, infrastructure used by fighters has been destroyed above and below ground. More than 4,000 excavation operations have also been carried out to locate and destroy tunnels.
The Air Force
Following the lessons of 7 October and its failure to stop thousands of fighters during the attack’s opening hours, the air force strengthened its preparedness for a large-scale surprise war across multiple fronts, including border-defence scenarios.
Specific operational orders were drawn up, authority delegated to field-level personnel was expanded, and intelligence collection efforts were adjusted. The air force’s defence and attack doctrine was also changed.
According to Walla, the number of forces on alert increased to as much as four times the level on the eve of the war, and to six times that level in some formations.
The command system and mechanisms for building situational awareness were also strengthened to provide an immediate response in both defence and attack. Readiness for surprise scenarios is continuously tested through training and exercises involving field-level personnel and the operations staff.
The changes also include closer cooperation on border protection, shorter aerial response times along the borders, stronger protection of Israeli airspace at low altitudes and improved defence of air force bases. Implementation of the lessons learned in these areas is also being monitored.
The report notes, however, that despite the scale of the surprise, the air force managed to regain its footing. According to the website, it has achieved results “of international significance” across the different fronts since 7 October.
The Operations Directorate
According to Walla, the head of the Operations Directorate, Major General Itzik Cohen, has increased the number of General Staff exercises, focusing on defence, surprise scenarios involving multiple fronts and assessments conducted by the chief of staff.
The measures include checking the implementation of lessons learned during each assessment, as well as activating forces and alert arrangements on the ground in real time.
It was also decided to update the doctrine for defence and response to surprise attacks, establish an operational standard, expand alert and reserve arrangements, and introduce changes to the Operations Brigade and its working methods.
Northern Command
Within Northern Command, a new defence doctrine was adopted based on preventing the enemy from consolidating its presence, according to the report.
Walla says this approach has been reflected in clearing operations in southern Lebanon, changes to the defence doctrine in Syria and the Golan Heights, stronger protection for northern communities, the creation of rapid-response units and a reorganisation of the area.
The report concludes by asking whether these operational changes are sufficient to address the deeper failures that preceded the attack, particularly the organisational culture that shaped risk assessments and the handling of warning signs.
