Why Does Israel Not Want a War with the Houthis?
Israeli reports indicate that the military prefers to address the threat posed by the pro-Iranian militia through a regional and international coalition led by Washington, rather than launching unilateral strikes that could open a new war of attrition, amid Tel Aviv’s recognition that direct military strikes would not be sufficient to eliminate the threat once and for all.
Officials in Israel’s defense establishment are pushing for the Houthi threat in Yemen to be addressed through a regional and international effort, arguing that a limited Israeli military response would not be enough to eliminate the danger posed by the group, according to Haaretz on Tuesday.
The assessment comes as Israel is engaged in a broad confrontation with Iran, while the Houthis, backed by Tehran, continue to strengthen their presence along Yemen’s western coast and threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
According to Haaretz, officials in Israel’s defense agencies believe that the best response to the Houthi threat lies in a “regional solution,” rather than having Israel bear sole responsibility for confronting the group. The approach is based on the assessment that military strikes, even if they inflicted significant damage on the Houthis’ military infrastructure, would not be sufficient to eliminate their ability to continue carrying out attacks.
The position reflects Israeli caution about opening a new geographically distant front at a time when Israeli forces are already facing military and intelligence pressures as a result of the war with Iran.
Israel has the capability to conduct long-range strikes against targets in Yemen and has previously targeted Houthi positions in response to missile and drone attacks against its territory.
Such strikes can destroy launch platforms or military facilities, but they do not guarantee the elimination of the Houthis’ operational capabilities, particularly given their presence across large areas of Yemen and their ability to redeploy their forces and offensive assets.
Officials also fear that a direct Israeli escalation could lead to a prolonged cycle of reciprocal attacks, with the group responding to Israeli strikes by targeting Israel or interests linked to it, thereby adding a new front to a war that Israel is already fighting across multiple theaters.
The sensitivity of this possibility is heightened by the close relationship between the Houthis and Iran. From Israel’s perspective, the group is part of a network of armed forces linked to Tehran, making any broad confrontation with it capable of becoming integrated into the larger conflict between Israel and Iran.
Thus, Israel’s defense establishment appears to prefer that dealing with the Houthis be incorporated into broader arrangements involving the United States and countries in the region, rather than turning Yemen into a direct and long-term Israeli front.
The Houthi threat is not limited to Israel. Its repercussions have expanded to international shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, two of the most important trade routes between Asia and Europe, as well as energy flows and the Suez Canal.
According to the Israeli assessment, these developments reinforce the idea that the Houthi threat has become a regional and international security and economic problem, rather than merely a bilateral conflict between the group and Israel.
The Houthis intensified their attacks on ships in the Red Sea following the outbreak of the war in Gaza and also launched missile and drone attacks toward Israel.
Israel responded on several occasions with strikes against targets in Yemen, but those operations did not permanently eliminate the threat.
Israeli analysts believe that this experience highlights the limits of military power when dealing with an armed group operating in a complex geographical environment and possessing the ability to conceal and redeploy its forces.
In this context, advocating a regional solution does not mean that Israel is ruling out the use of force against the Houthis. Rather, it indicates a desire to avoid bearing the military and political burden alone.
This calculation could change if Houthi attacks escalate to a level that directly threatens Israeli interests or if the United States decides to launch a large-scale military operation in Yemen.
But under current circumstances, the priority for Israel’s defense establishment appears to be preventing the Houthi threat from turning into a new open-ended war for Israel.
This approach reveals a broader dilemma facing Israel in its multi-front war: having the ability to strike an adversary does not necessarily mean having the ability to eliminate the threat it poses. In the case of the Houthis, an additional military campaign could weaken their capabilities in the short term, but it could leave Israel facing a new front of attrition without guaranteeing that the underlying factors enabling the group to continue its activities would be addressed.
Against this backdrop, the defense officials’ call for a “regional solution” takes on significance extending beyond Yemen. It reflects an Israeli effort to distribute the burden of confronting Iran-linked forces across a broader coalition, rather than expanding the current war into a new military path whose consequences could prove difficult to control.
