Trump and Iranian nuclear fuel: a strategic move to decide the war
The mission to seize or destroy Iran’s nuclear fuel could become one of the most dangerous military operations in modern U.S. history.
In recent days, U.S. President Donald Trump has reiterated that the war against Iran was launched because Tehran was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, which he claimed would have been used first against Israel and then against the United States.
According to The New York Times, Trump’s remarks suggest he is considering what could be the largest operation ever carried out against Iran: the seizure of Iranian nuclear materials, most of which are believed to be stored deep within a mountain in Isfahan.
The newspaper described such an operation as, by all measures, one of the boldest and most hazardous in recent American military history. The exact location of the fuel remains uncertain, and if the containers were breached, any leaking gas would be both toxic and radioactive. Conversely, if the containers were brought too close together, there would be a risk of an uncontrolled nuclear reaction.
Weeks earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress that such an operation could only be carried out by deploying special forces to take control of the situation. Trump, for his part, said on Tuesday that ground operations do not concern him.
It is clear that Trump is seriously contemplating this option, which he previously said he would only pursue if the Iranian military were sufficiently weakened to the point of being unable to sustain ground combat.
At the same time, Trump appears to be grappling with how to end the war. Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University, warned that if Trump were to halt the effort, he would leave behind “a weakened but deeply resentful regime, possibly more determined than ever to build a nuclear weapon, while still retaining the materials, expertise, and equipment to do so.”
In repeatedly emphasizing the nuclear threat, Trump appears to overstate the speed at which underground stockpiles could be turned into a weapon. He told reporters on Tuesday that Iran was “one month” away from obtaining a nuclear weapon before the bombing of three nuclear sites in June 2025.
Before the current war began, most intelligence officials assessed that there was no significant imminent threat of Iran rushing to build a nuclear bomb.
After 18 days of U.S. and Israeli bombardment that significantly degraded Iran’s conventional missile capabilities, nuclear materials now appear to represent one of Tehran’s last strategic assets.
George Perkovich, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: “They see it as more necessary than ever and may be prepared to defend it.”
He added: “Iran understands that Israel and the United States want to destroy these materials or remove them from the country. It is therefore likely that numerous containers have been concealed, so that when special forces arrive, they may encounter hundreds or even thousands instead of just a few dozen. They will do everything possible to obstruct access.”
The United States has been planning for such scenarios for years, establishing specialized nuclear-trained units within its special operations forces, trained to disable weapons, dismantle centrifuges, and handle nuclear materials.
These operations are shrouded in extreme secrecy, to the extent that even basic questions—such as whether the United States would destroy the containers or attempt to extract them—remain unanswered.
It is also unclear whether Washington would opt for a covert, limited operation or deploy larger forces with air cover. It is likely, however, that U.S. forces would need to inspect multiple sites in search of nuclear materials.
Perkovich noted that while much of the stockpile is believed to be in Isfahan, some may be located elsewhere, including in tunnels at a site informally known as “Pickaxe Mountain,” as well as in damaged enrichment facilities in Fordow and Natanz.
Given these complexities, the Trump administration may reconsider a proposal put forward by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi shortly before the attack. He suggested that Iran would be willing to dilute all its nuclear materials to reactor-grade levels under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, while refusing to allow them to be removed from the country.
This proposal was rejected by U.S. negotiators Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law, and Steve Witkoff, his special envoy, who insisted that Iran must not be allowed to retain any stockpile of nuclear fuel. Instead, they proposed that the United States supply Iran with low-enriched uranium suitable for civilian reactors on a permanent and free basis—an offer that Tehran declined, according to sources familiar with the talks.
All wars eventually come to an end. In any future ceasefire negotiations, another opportunity may arise to address the fate of nuclear materials. U.S. access to the fuel—and potentially its removal or dilution—could become part of a broader agreement, though such an outcome currently appears unlikely.
