EUToday and Hivileo Expose Fractures in Sudan’s Wartime Alliance: A Proposed Fuel-for-Fighters Deal Fuels Tensions Between al-Burhan and Islamists
Sudan’s political and military circles have witnessed highly sensitive developments exposing deep fractures within the wartime alliance led by Transitional Sovereignty Council Chairman and army commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. International reporting, particularly from British and Lebanese outlets, has revealed the background to a controversial military and political arrangement discussed behind closed doors. It allegedly involved offering Saudi Arabia Sudanese fighters for the war in Yemen in exchange for essential fuel supplies and economic support. The proposal reportedly triggered profound and increasingly public disagreements between the army leadership and its allies among political Islamist movements and ideologically driven combat brigades.
The Alleged Deal and the Fuel Crisis
Sudan is enduring a devastating war that has ravaged its resources, making access to energy, fuel and financing critical to the army’s continued military operations. Against this backdrop, outlets including EUToday and Defence Matters reported a proposal for Sudan to provide ground reinforcements supporting Saudi forces against continuing Houthi threats. In return, Riyadh would secure reliable petroleum products and fuel supplies for Sudan’s military apparatus and army-controlled areas.
The pragmatic arrangement al-Burhan reportedly sought to promote nevertheless encountered strong domestic opposition. Sudanese military sources cited by Al-Sudaniya News quickly denied that the request had been accepted, stating that the army ultimately refused to send fighters to Yemen. This reportedly reflected the substantial pressure exerted on the military leadership by its battlefield partners.
Tensions Within al-Burhan’s Wartime Alliance
The rejection of the proposed deal was reportedly more than a tactical military decision. It was also driven by threats to the cohesion of al-Burhan’s domestic camp. According to Defence Matters, the attempt to conclude the arrangement publicly exposed the fragility of the ruling coalition in Port Sudan. Al-Burhan does not conduct the war alone: he relies heavily on battalions and brigades affiliated with the Islamist current, including the Islamic Movement and the dissolved National Congress Party, which have thousands of ideologically committed fighters on the ground.
These groups, which regained military influence through popular resistance structures and mobilisation campaigns, reportedly viewed rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and a military agreement as a direct threat to their ideological and political interests, particularly given the longstanding mutual suspicion between Sudanese Islamists and Riyadh.
Turning Away from Riyadh: The Army’s and Muslim Brotherhood’s Calculations
The website Lebanon Files reported that Sudan’s army and Muslim Brotherhood ultimately chose to “turn their backs” on the Saudi military request. Several strategic considerations reportedly informed this decision:
- Prioritising the domestic front: Islamist battalion commanders believe every weapon and fighter should be directed towards battles in Khartoum, Al-Jazira State and El-Fasher against the Rapid Support Forces. Diverting the war effort to foreign fronts would, in their view, amount to military suicide.
- Sovereignty and independent decision-making: the Islamist current reportedly wants to demonstrate that it is an indispensable force in the current governing equation and holds an effective veto over al-Burhan’s sovereign and military decisions.
- Fear of internal division: al-Burhan reportedly recognises that proceeding with a deal opposed by Islamist brigades could trigger serious defections among his fighting forces, threatening his entire political and military position.
A Grave Record of Abuses and War Crimes: Child Recruitment and Summary Executions
The danger posed by these Islamist militias reportedly extends beyond political defiance and rejection of regional agendas. The account also attributes to them a grave record of human rights violations and war crimes described as internationally documented.
According to the reported findings of UN and international human rights organisations, members of Al-Bara ibn Malik carried out systematic forced recruitment of children from schools and mosques in Khartoum neighbourhoods in July 2026, sending them into combat.
In August 2026, battalion members reportedly conducted summary executions of unarmed civilians in Omdurman on grounds of suspected allegiance.
The reports cited state that these militias became fully integrated into joint security cells alongside the police and the General Intelligence Service. They allegedly carried out arbitrary arrests and systematic torture in secret detention facilities, further undermining the remaining foundations of a state capable of protecting its population.
Human rights statements issued in 2026 indicated that collapsing judicial and security institutions, together with expanding externally supported organised crime networks, had forced innocent civilians to pay the price for subordinating national resources to extremist organisational agendas.
The European and international reports referenced stressed that continuing impunity and the absence of robust accountability mechanisms encouraged these groups, which they described as terrorist entities, to expand their economic influence through the war economy and the looting of humanitarian assistance.
Ending Iranian influence and its networks connected to remnants of the former regime is presented as an urgent necessity for restoring regional stability and securing international shipping routes in the Red Sea.
From this perspective, supporting Sudan’s active democratic civilian forces and applying meaningful pressure to dismantle militia military structures remain the only route to preserving what remains of national unity and rebuilding a state governed by institutions and the rule of law.
