From Bandar Abbas to Port Sudan: How Satellite Images Traced Iranian Supply Routes to the Sudanese Army
Sudan’s war, which began on April 15, 2023, can no longer be understood solely through its ground front lines. Flight-tracking data and satellite imagery have revealed recurring air routes connecting Sudan to regional and international hubs. At the centre of this map, Port Sudan Airport has emerged as a focal point in investigations into military supplies, amid indicators linking cargo flights from Iran to deliveries of equipment to the Sudanese army.
The significance of this case lies not simply in observing foreign aircraft landing at a Sudanese airport, but in combining several strands of evidence: aircraft identities, registration numbers, flight paths, arrival dates and satellite images showing their presence on the ground. When these elements are cross-referenced with published information about the operators and their records, a more detailed picture emerges of the logistical infrastructure that could help sustain military operations.
Investigations published by Eekad, a platform specialising in open-source investigations and analysis of satellite imagery and flight data, indicate that the air supply network associated with the Sudanese army developed gradually during the war. Flights attributed to Iran’s Fars Air Qeshm feature prominently in this pattern. The company has previously been linked in reports and US sanctions to transport activities associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Reconstructing this network, however, requires distinguishing three levels of evidence: observing an aircraft at an airport, establishing its flight route and proving that its cargo was military and reached the intended recipient. These levels are connected but not identical. A cargo flight cannot independently establish an arms shipment without additional information supporting that conclusion.
Port Sudan: From Civilian Airport to a Supply Network Hub
Port Sudan gained exceptional importance after the war began, as the army leadership and Sudanese government relocated to the Red Sea coastal city. Its geographical position and administrative and logistical functions made its airport and associated facilities important locations to monitor when examining aircraft movements and incoming supplies.
Over time, attention expanded beyond the number of arriving flights to changes in airport infrastructure. According to Eekad’s investigations, satellite imagery showed expansion and development of aircraft parking areas, including a new apron covering approximately 50,000 square metres and the enlargement of a secondary apron from around 25,000 to 38,000 square metres.
These changes become significant when compared with flights observed during the same period. Expanding parking areas can increase the airport’s operational capacity to receive, park and manoeuvre aircraft. The expansion alone, however, does not prove that the facilities were built exclusively for military shipments or establish the nature of the cargo passing through them.
Comparing images taken on different dates reveals physical changes at the airport, while flight data helps place them within the context of air traffic. When these indicators coincide with the appearance of cargo aircraft associated with military matters, the airport becomes an important investigative focus. Establishing the nature of each transport operation nevertheless requires its own evidence.
Aircraft EP-FAB: A Specific Lead in the Supply Route
Among the observations highlighted by Eekad was a Boeing 747-281F cargo aircraft registered EP-FAB and operated by Fars Air Qeshm. According to the published investigation, the aircraft appeared at Port Sudan Airport on December 7, 2023, and was observed again on January 16, 2024.
This observation matters because it identifies the model, registration, operator and two observation dates rather than merely referring to an unidentified cargo plane. The platform also cited a high-resolution satellite image taken by Maxar on January 16, 2024, which it said showed the aircraft at the airport with its front cargo door open. It interpreted the scene in the context of a cargo unloading operation.
Eekad linked these flights to the arrival of Iranian drones in Sudan, particularly Mohajer-6 aircraft. According to its presentation, that connection rests on combining flight tracking, the aircraft’s presence in Port Sudan and indicators concerning Iranian military supplies.
However, an image of an aircraft parked at an airport, even with its cargo door open, does not by itself reveal the contents of the shipment. Establishing whether it contained drones, spare parts, ammunition or other materials requires additional evidence, such as shipping documents, independent information about the cargo or reliable evidence connecting the flight to specific equipment.
The strength of this observation is that it provides a clearly defined starting point for verification. Investigators can compare the aircraft’s information with other flights, movement dates and landing locations rather than drawing conclusions from the unspecified appearance of a foreign plane.
From Bandar Abbas to the Red Sea
The flights attributed to EP-FAB gain additional significance from information about its activity in Iran. According to the data cited in the investigations discussed in the article, its Port Sudan flights were linked to Bandar Abbas Airport, on the Strait of Hormuz, a strategically important location within Iran’s maritime and aviation transport network.
According to information drawn from subsequent research reports, the aircraft was attributed at least seven confirmed military cargo flights to Port Sudan between December 2023 and July 2024. Two additional flights were considered highly probable after tracking data stopped shortly before landing.
These figures should be understood as findings attributed to the investigations on which the article relies, rather than a definitive tally independently verified here. Loss of a tracking signal does not, on its own, establish that a flight carried military cargo, although it may warrant investigation when accompanied by other evidence.
The central questions remain the shipments’ contents, the identity of their recipients and how they entered Sudan’s military system. Establishing a recurring air route differs from proving that every flight carried weapons. Likewise, proving the transfer of military equipment does not by itself identify the unit that received it or the operations in which it was used.
Fars Air Qeshm and Its US Sanctions Record
The investigation into the aircraft cannot be separated from its operator’s background. In January 2019, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Fars Air Qeshm and two of its aircraft, accusing the company of transporting cargo for the Revolutionary Guard, including flights associated with military activities in the region.
This record provides important context when examining flights subsequently observed travelling to Sudan. It does not, however, automatically prove the nature of every flight the company operated after being sanctioned. A precise assessment must connect the earlier record with specific events, including dates, routes, cargoes and beneficiaries.
According to the article, later research reports used open data and information collected by conflict-documentation initiatives, including Conflict Observatory and the Dutch organisation PAX, to track flights attributed to the aircraft. Subsequent media reports also referred to its continued use in other cargo missions linked to Sudan.
This background demonstrates the importance of combining operational data with the company’s institutional record without confusing previous accusations with proof about a particular flight. Each event requires its own evidence, especially when identifying the equipment transported and its recipient.
Iranian Drones and the Changing Nature of the War
Interest in Iranian supplies is also connected to reports of Iranian drones appearing in Sudan’s theatre of operations, particularly the Mohajer-6. If the details of their transfer and use are confirmed, their introduction would indicate that the supply network extends beyond conventional weapons and ammunition to systems requiring training, operation, maintenance and spare parts.
The effectiveness of any drone system depends on several elements: the aircraft themselves, personnel capable of operating them, communications, supporting equipment, power supplies and maintenance. Analysis of military support should therefore go beyond counting aircraft arriving at an airport and examine whether infrastructure exists to absorb the equipment, operate it and sustain its use.
Flight observations alone cannot establish the size of the drone fleet delivered to Sudan, the number of sorties flown or its direct effect on the war. Those questions require independent evidence, such as verified images of equipment inside Sudan, reliable information about its use or reports identifying operating locations and dates of appearance.
This underscores the importance of combining aviation evidence, satellite imagery and information from the ground. Each source answers part of the question, but a fuller picture emerges only when the sources intersect in a verifiable way.
From Aircraft to Network
The EP-FAB case shows how open-source analysis can turn a flight into an entry point for understanding a broader supply network. A specific registration allows movements to be tracked, observation dates help establish a timeline, satellite images provide visual evidence of the aircraft’s presence and the operator’s background places the activity in a wider context.
Turning these elements into an accurate estimate of military support remains a different challenge. The number of flights does not necessarily equal the number of military shipments, and observing a cargo aircraft does not establish the cargo’s weight, nature or value. Some flights may be commercial or logistical, while attributing others to arms transfers requires more specific evidence.
Assessment becomes harder when information is incomplete or tracking data stops during parts of a flight. Satellite imagery may also show the aircraft or infrastructure changes without revealing container contents or where equipment went after unloading.
Any estimate of supplies therefore requires a clear method distinguishing confirmed flights, probable flights and movements whose nature cannot be determined, while explaining the confidence level attached to each conclusion. This approach does not weaken an investigation; it makes it more precise and better able to withstand review.
A Network Beyond Port Sudan
The case’s significance extends beyond Port Sudan and the Iranian aircraft alone. The material underlying this analysis also refers to cargo routes associated with Istanbul, Cairo, Muscat and Egypt’s Sharq Al-Uwaynat Airport, as well as a possible role for Eritrea’s Massawa Airport and military sites inside Sudan, including Wadi Sayyidna.
These indicators suggest that understanding air supply requires examining a network of potential departure, transit and arrival points rather than reducing it to a single route. An airport’s appearance on a flight map does not automatically mean it served a military role, and repeated air traffic is insufficient on its own to establish the nature of shipments.
Ultimately, EP-FAB’s movements illustrate the importance of tracing cumulative evidence to understand logistical support associated with Sudan’s war. The volume of weapons transported, their recipients and their impact on military operations still require further documentation. The available material nevertheless indicates that Port Sudan has become a central focus of air supply investigations. Aircraft and flight routes provide important leads, but they do not replace proof of the cargo’s contents and the recipient’s identity in each case.
