Policy
Al-Sudani’s Openness to Normalization with Syria Fuels Divisions within the Coordination Framework
Ammar al-Hakim’s support for the invitation extended to Ahmad al-Sharaa to participate in the upcoming Arab summit comes amid staunch opposition from Nouri al-Maliki and several factions within the Coordination Framework, as well as leaders of armed groups, to this rapprochement.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s invitation to interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to attend the Arab summit scheduled in Baghdad, preceded by a meeting between the two leaders in Qatar, has sparked intense tensions within the Coordination Framework. These developments have highlighted the formation of opposing political alliances, in a context of internal polarization that extends beyond the Syrian issue to upcoming electoral arrangements.
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This move, interpreted by opponents as a step toward “gradual normalization” with the new Syrian regime, received explicit support from the leader of the al-Hikma movement, Ammar al-Hakim.
He strongly defended the outreach, describing it as part of Iraq’s “sovereign decisions,” and stressed that Syria’s participation in the Arab Summit is not a political choice, but rather a protocol matter, given Syria’s membership in the Arab League. This divergence is no longer hidden within the Framework. A new political map is taking shape, most notably with increasing closeness between al-Sudani and al-Hakim, in contrast to a traditional wing led by Nouri al-Maliki.
This faction includes Shiite figures who see any outreach to Syria as a “violation of principles”—especially considering President al-Sharaa’s controversial past and the outstanding Iraqi arrest warrant against him from years ago when he was affiliated with al-Qaeda. Political sources told Iraq’s Kurdish news site Shafaq News that a recent Framework meeting witnessed clear tensions. Maliki left the session early in protest of the meeting between al-Sudani and al-Sharaa, while Qais al-Khazali was absent—a move interpreted as indirect opposition to Syrian engagement.
Al-Sudani’s moves, particularly regarding regional issues, are increasingly seen in a broader context—possibly preparing for an electoral alliance with al-Hakim based on repositioning Iraq regionally, reducing dependence on the Iranian axis, and gradually opening up to Arab states, including Syria. This rapprochement is causing rising concern among some circles within the Framework, who fear it could lead to new alignments that would weaken traditional forces in the Shiite political arena—especially if this harmony translates into a formal electoral alliance in upcoming contests. In defending these policies, al-Sudani emphasized that strengthening ties with Damascus is not merely a political option but a security necessity.
He pointed out that cooperation with Syria is essential for securing the western border and preventing ISIS cell infiltrations, in addition to easing American pressure on Iraq regarding this complex file. Al-Hakim backed this stance from a different perspective, stressing that “Iraq is a central state that cannot be isolated from regional files.” He noted that all active regional players—from Turkey to the Gulf—are engaged in the Syrian file, questioning: “Is it reasonable to exclude Iraq?” Should Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Baghdad take place, it will serve as a real test of al-Sudani’s government’s cohesion—not just internally, but also in its relations with Framework forces and its regional and international surroundings.
Despite legal controversies surrounding al-Sharaa’s past, legal experts confirmed that he currently enjoys immunity as a head of state and cannot be prosecuted or arrested—granting official and binding status to any diplomatic interaction with him. In this context, Aqil al-Rudaini, spokesperson for the Victory Alliance led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, stated that “the Iraqi government is responsible for providing full protection to any visiting head of state,” adding that any attempt to disrupt the visit would be considered an affront to Iraq’s reputation and institutions.
The divisions within the Coordination Framework over ties with Syria cannot be isolated from the broader political scene in Iraq. Positions on Damascus have become a litmus test for where each faction stands in terms of regional transformations and their willingness to adapt to declining Iranian influence and the rise of new Arab roles in the region.
