Turkey and Ideology in Sudan: How Ankara Turned a Power Struggle into an Identity War
One of the most dangerous aspects of Turkey’s intervention in the Sudanese crisis is its ideological dimension. Under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey did not treat Sudan merely as a political or security issue, but also as an ideological arena through which it sought to consolidate the influence of Islamist political movements that Ankara viewed as a natural extension of its regional project. This ideological dimension transformed a struggle over power and resources into an identity war marked by intense polarization, making a settlement more difficult and deepening the conflict.
The Legacy of Omar al-Bashir: The Ideological Bridge between Ankara and Khartoum
The regime of Omar al-Bashir, who ruled Sudan for three decades, developed close relations with Turkey on the basis of a shared ideology. Both regimes promoted political Islam, and both sought to build a model of governance that blended religion and politics. This ideological relationship made Sudan, under al-Bashir, a natural ally of Turkey and provided Ankara with a deep network of relations within Sudanese state institutions and civil society.
When the December 2018 revolution overthrew al-Bashir, this ideological network did not disappear. On the contrary, elements of the former regime with ideological ties to Turkey sought to reorganize themselves by taking advantage of Turkish support. This ideological legacy means that Turkey did not enter the Sudanese crisis as a neutral party, but rather as an ally of a specific ideological current seeking to regain power.
Sudanese Islamists: Ankara’s Allies in the Battle to Return
After al-Bashir’s overthrow, Sudanese Islamist political currents sought to reorganize themselves and return to the political arena. Turkey was the most prominent supporter of these efforts, providing political, media and logistical backing. Ankara viewed Sudanese Islamists as natural ideological allies. Their return to power would mean strengthening Turkish influence in Sudan.
This Turkish support for the Islamists contributed significantly to the complexity of the Sudanese situation. Instead of remaining a conflict between two military institutions that could potentially negotiate with each other, the conflict acquired an ideological dimension through Turkish intervention, making the equation more complicated. The Islamists, supported by Turkey, sought to inflame the conflict and prolong it, hoping that chaos would enable them to return to power.
Turkish Media: A Propaganda Machine Serving Ideology
Turkish support for Sudanese Islamists was not limited to the political and military spheres; it also extended to the media. Turkish media networks, as well as other outlets linked to Turkey, sought to promote a particular narrative about the Sudanese crisis that served the ideological current supported by Ankara. These media outlets portrayed the conflict in a manner that served Turkey’s allies, demonized certain actors and justified the actions of others.
This use of the media transformed the public perception of the Sudanese crisis from a struggle over power into a conflict between ideological camps. The result was a deepening of polarization within Sudanese society, as each side adopted the narrative supported by its external ideological backers. Through this media strategy, Turkey contributed to turning the conflict into an identity war that is difficult to end through negotiation.
Erdoğan and Sudan: A Regional Project under Ideological Cover
Turkey’s intervention in Sudan cannot be separated from President Erdoğan’s broader regional project. This project is based on the idea of Turkish leadership of the Sunni Muslim world and on the construction of a network of ideological allies throughout the region. Given its strategic location and demographic weight, Sudan represents an important link in this project.
Erdoğan visited Sudan in 2017 not only to build bilateral relations, but also to establish a foothold in a broader regional project. Suakin Island, military agreements and relations with Islamist groups were all part of this project. After the conflict erupted in 2023, the project continued in various forms. This means that Turkey does not view Sudan as an isolated issue, but as part of a comprehensive regional strategy.
This strategic perspective means that Turkey has no strong interest in ending the conflict quickly, since its continuation gives Ankara an opportunity to strengthen its influence and rearrange its position. Ankara prefers a weak and divided Sudan that it can influence over a stable and powerful Sudan capable of rejecting foreign interference.
Education and Culture: Instruments of Turkish Soft Power
Alongside military, political and media tools, Turkey has used instruments of soft power in Sudan. Turkish educational institutions, scholarships, cultural centers and charitable organizations linked to the Turkish government have all worked to build a network of ideological influence within Sudanese society.
Although these tools may appear harmless on the surface, in the context of a civil conflict they become instruments of polarization. Students studying in Turkey, beneficiaries of Turkish assistance and individuals connected to Turkish cultural institutions all become part of an ideological influence network serving Turkish interests. This soft power has contributed to creating divisions within Sudanese society, with the emergence of a group ideologically and culturally connected to Turkey.
Ideological Diplomacy: Turkey and the Manipulation of Political Processes
Turkey has used its ideological influence to affect the political and diplomatic processes concerning Sudan. Ankara sought to ensure the presence of its Islamist allies in any negotiations or future political arrangements. This effort conflicted with the demands of broad sectors of the Sudanese population, who had risen up against Islamist rule and sought to build a civilian state.
This manipulation of political processes contributed to the failure of several settlement initiatives. Whenever Sudanese actors came close to reaching an agreement, Turkey intervened through its allies to disrupt the consensus or impose conditions serving its ideological interests. The result was continuing political paralysis and a prolonged conflict.
Turkey and the December Revolution: A Reversal of the People’s Will
One of the most negative aspects of Turkish intervention was Ankara’s position toward the December 2018 revolution. While the Sudanese people were making great sacrifices to overthrow an authoritarian Islamist regime, Turkey supported that regime and regarded it as an ally. After the revolution succeeded, Turkey did not recognize the will of the Sudanese people; instead, it sought to support counter-revolutionary forces linked to the former regime.
This Turkish position fundamentally contradicts the will of the Sudanese people and reveals that Ankara does not respect the choices of nations, but rather seeks to impose an ideological model on them. This interference in the will of the Sudanese people is one of the deepest causes of the crisis’s complexity, because it means that a regional power is working against Sudanese aspirations for freedom and democracy.
Long-Term Impact: Poisoning the Political Future
Turkey’s ideological intervention in Sudan is not limited to the present moment; its effects extend into the future. The construction of ideological influence networks, the education of generations according to particular ideas and the media promotion of specific narratives all serve to poison Sudan’s political future. Even if the current war ends, the ideological polarization fueled by Turkey will remain an obstacle to building national consensus.
This long-term impact makes Turkish intervention more dangerous than mere arms supplies or military support. It is an intervention in consciousness, culture and identity—an intervention that is more difficult to address and whose effects last longer.
The ideological dimension of Turkey’s intervention in Sudan represents its most dangerous aspect. Ankara has not merely fueled the conflict with weapons; it has also worked to transform it into an identity war and an ideological confrontation that is difficult to end. This intervention has turned a conflict that could be resolved through negotiation into an existential crisis threatening Sudan’s unity and future. Sudanese society must collectively recognize the danger of this ideological intervention and reject all forms of external tutelage over the choices of the Sudanese people. Sudan belongs to the Sudanese, and no regional power, regardless of its ambitions, has the right to impose an ideological model on them or determine the form of their state and their future.
