The Red Sea First: Why Saudi Influence Is Becoming Increasingly Important in Sudan
Saudi policy towards Sudan cannot be fully understood without placing the Red Sea at the centre of the picture. Sudan is not only an Arab and African country experiencing a devastating civil war; it also possesses a long coastline along one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors.
Saudi Arabia lies directly across from that coast. Developments in Port Sudan, the country’s ports, coastal facilities and maritime border areas therefore cannot be viewed as purely domestic Sudanese affairs.
This also helps explain Riyadh’s growing interest in its relationship with the authorities based in Port Sudan, particularly army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
The most sensitive question is whether Saudi Arabia is seeking only to protect Red Sea security or whether it intends to build long-term influence on the opposite Sudanese shore. The distinction between those two objectives is substantial.
Sudan as a Strategic Gateway
The Red Sea has become an arena of intensifying regional and international competition. Ports, shipping lanes, energy projects, marine resources and coastal investments all give Sudan considerable strategic value.
For Saudi Arabia, the presence of a strong and cooperative Sudanese authority along the coast could serve its security interests.
A country experiencing internal war, however, cannot easily make long-term strategic decisions without raising questions about the legitimacy of the authority taking them. This lies at the heart of the current controversy.
If the authority governing Sudan during wartime makes decisions whose consequences will extend across decades, Sudanese citizens are entitled to ask whether those measures are temporary or will become permanent obligations.
The Maritime Border Issue
This question has become increasingly sensitive with renewed discussion of the maritime boundary between Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The issue dates back to a 1974 agreement and has long been associated with sovereignty, borders and maritime rights.
According to the sources on which this analysis is based, recent developments suggest that the matter has entered a new technical and institutional phase. This reportedly involves reviewing maps and documents and coordinating the work of specialised Sudanese institutions.
A distinction must nevertheless be made between technical or administrative preparations and the signing of a final agreement.
The establishment of a committee or a review of maps does not automatically mean that borders have changed or that a new agreement has entered into force. The significance of the issue lies, however, in its timing.
Sudan has been at war since April 2023 and does not have an elected parliament performing its normal legislative role. Any long-term strategic arrangements therefore require the highest possible degree of transparency and public debate.
Why Is the Red Sea Important to Saudi Arabia?
Saudi Arabia’s interest in Red Sea security is clear. In recent years, this body of water has become increasingly important to global trade and energy security. Attacks on ships and threats to maritime navigation have demonstrated the corridor’s vulnerability.
In September 2026, for example, regional tensions prompted France to reinforce its military resources in Saudi Arabia to protect energy-related facilities amid mounting threats.
This security environment gives Riyadh a stronger interest in developments on the western shore of the Red Sea. Yet maritime security and the reorganisation of sovereign rights are two different matters.
Cooperation between Riyadh and Port Sudan in monitoring maritime traffic, combating smuggling or protecting facilities may be entirely natural. If such security cooperation develops into permanent arrangements concerning maritime boundaries or economic resources, however, it begins to affect the sovereign rights of an entire state.
Investment During Wartime
Investment is another issue that makes Saudi-Sudanese relations particularly sensitive. Sudan possesses substantial natural resources, an extensive coastline, ports, agricultural land and a wide range of investment opportunities.
Investing in a country at war nevertheless raises a fundamental question: who determines the terms of those investments?
In a stable state, legislative, judicial and regulatory institutions can review contracts and agreements.
During wartime, however, the concentration of decision-making power in transitional and military institutions makes any long-term agreement more vulnerable to controversy. This issue is not limited to Saudi Arabia.
Any country seeking to invest in post-war Sudan will require a legitimate legal framework and stable institutions capable of ensuring that agreements do not become a new source of conflict.
Is Riyadh Seeking a Powerful Partner?
It is reasonable for Saudi Arabia to seek a Sudanese partner capable of protecting shared interests. Choosing a partner in a country experiencing civil war, however, carries a political cost.
If that partner is a military institution, the relationship may become tied to the continued presence of that institution at the centre of the political system.
The security interest then moves beyond protecting borders and ports and develops into a political interest in the very structure of the Sudanese state. This is where concerns begin to arise.
If Riyadh wants a stable Sudan, the question is whether it seeks the stability of the state and its institutions or the stability of a particular authority. The two are not the same.
Al-Burhan’s Relationship With Riyadh
Direct meetings between the Saudi leadership and al-Burhan demonstrate the depth of their relationship.
In April 2026, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received al-Burhan in Jeddah. Senior Saudi officials responsible for defence, foreign affairs and security attended the meeting.
In its official statement, Riyadh reaffirmed its support for Sudan’s security, stability, unity and sovereignty.
This rhetoric places Sudanese unity at the forefront. Yet unity cannot be preserved solely by supporting a military institution. It also requires a political settlement that ends the war and rebuilds state institutions.
In June 2026, Saudi Arabia reiterated before the United Nations Security Council its support for a Sudanese political solution and a ceasefire.
The real test of Saudi policy will therefore be whether Riyadh can transform its influence over the army’s leadership into pressure for a negotiated settlement.
From Influence to Responsibility
As Saudi influence in Sudan increases, so does the political responsibility associated with it.
If Riyadh can influence the army’s leadership, regional relations, and economic and investment issues, its use of that leverage could make an important contribution to ending the war.
The same influence could become problematic, however, if it were used to entrench arrangements lacking broad Sudanese consensus. This is why transparency is essential.
Any matter involving maritime borders, ports or natural resources must be clearly presented to the Sudanese public.
Maps should be accessible. Documents must be open to review. Agreements should pass through institutions possessing the legal and political mandate to approve them.
Sudan is not merely a geographical space on the Red Sea. It is a state with sovereign rights and resources that will remain the property of future generations.
The Red Sea Must Not Become a Symbol of Divided Influence
The real danger does not lie in Saudi-Sudanese cooperation itself. Cooperation between states is entirely normal.
The risk is that the war could become an opportunity to redistribute influence in an exhausted country, with strategic decisions taken in the absence of representative institutions and effective oversight.
In such a scenario, the Red Sea would cease to be an area of cooperation and instead become a gateway for redefining the relationship between power, wealth and sovereignty.
The future of Saudi Arabia’s role in Sudan will ultimately be judged by whether Riyadh uses its position to help produce a broad political settlement or merely builds a stable relationship with the strongest authority on the ground.
Sudan needs peace, and Saudi Arabia needs security in the Red Sea. Achieving both objectives requires placing Sudanese sovereignty and national institutions at the centre of the equation, rather than treating them as details that can be bypassed in the name of security and investment imperatives.
