The Houthis Are Managing Bab el-Mandeb by Email!
The Wall Street Journal reports that shipping companies and captains are contacting a centre affiliated with the Houthi Ansar Allah militia for transit permissions and assurances, providing information about vessels, owners, crews and destinations.
The Houthis have established a mechanism for managing shipping through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait by receiving emailed requests from shipping companies and captains seeking assurances and permission to transit, The Wall Street Journal reported Friday. The initiative reflects an attempt to move beyond military threats against vessels towards imposing administrative oversight on one of the world’s most important maritime routes.
In an investigation titled “To Cross the Red Sea, Shipping Companies Email the Houthi Rebels. Read Their Inbox”, the newspaper reported that shipping companies had contacted the Houthi-run Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center, or HOCC, to obtain assurances of safe passage. The exchanges came amid growing fears that ships failing to comply with the group’s restrictions could be targeted.
The newspaper reviewed emails containing transit requests and declarations concerning the nationality of shipowners, operating companies and crew members, alongside voyage details and destinations.
Some requests included assurances that vessels had no links to Israel, the United States or the United Kingdom—the countries targeted by Houthi restrictions and threats.
The system forms part of an escalation that began last July, when the group announced a maritime blockade on Saudi-linked vessels, warning shipping companies against loading or unloading cargo at Saudi ports. This disrupted some tanker movements and led to the rerouting of vessels bound for Asia.
The Chinese vessel Zhong Cheng Chang Ling illustrates how the mechanism operates. Its management requested contact with the Houthi centre as an additional precaution before crossing the Red Sea in September.
The centre granted the ship permission valid for seven days, covering transit through the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. It required the vessel to keep its Automatic Identification System, or AIS, switched on and maintain a maritime radio watch on Channel 16.
Instructions also required compliance with international shipping lanes, avoidance of vessels with tracking systems switched off and military ships, and notification to the centre of suspicious activity or changes to the voyage.
After approval was obtained, tracking data on September 8 showed a change in the vessel’s declared destination, with a message indicating armed guards aboard. The ship continued through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb before reaching the Indian Ocean on September 11. It subsequently resumed displaying Port Klang, Malaysia, as its destination.
The requirement to keep AIS active raises security concerns. These systems disclose a vessel’s position, speed, heading, identity and destination—information that could help monitor maritime traffic and identify potential targets.
The correspondence does not, however, establish that the Chinese vessel’s data were used in military operations or that it faced a direct threat.
The Houthis established the HOCC in February 2024 through a decree issued by Supreme Political Council President Mahdi al-Mashat, placing it under the office of the armed forces’ supreme commander. Its stated responsibilities include coordinating vessel movements, clarifying maritime restrictions and receiving transit requests.
US maritime authorities warn against engaging with the Houthi centre or complying with requests to change routes, activate tracking systems or provide voyage information. They consider such communications a potential means of gathering intelligence that could be used to target vessels.
The US Maritime Administration advises commercial vessels to exercise caution regarding Houthi communications and report such requests to the relevant authorities, prioritising maritime safety and security.
Receiving approval from the centre does not mean the Houthis possess internationally recognised legal authority to issue navigation permits. Rather, it reflects an attempt to impose a de facto arrangement. The available information also does not suggest that all vessels must seek permission. Nevertheless, some companies’ use of the mechanism illustrates how strongly military threats are shaping shipping decisions.
Reuters reported in July on contacts between China and the Houthis aimed at securing safe-passage assurances for Chinese oil tankers, particularly those carrying Saudi crude from Yanbu. The agency said some tankers changed course after the blockade announcement, while others resumed voyages after receiving assurances.
These developments reveal an evolving Houthi approach. Beyond attacking vessels and threatening maritime routes, the group is attempting to build a communications and monitoring system that allows it to influence shipping movements and commercial decisions. It is exploiting insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb, the southern gateway to the Red Sea and the maritime route leading to the Suez Canal.
International trade consequently faces a growing dilemma. Shipping companies must weigh the risks of ignoring Houthi threats against those of handing operational and security information to an armed group whose authority over navigation is not internationally recognised.
