Cyber Jihad and Information Warfare: How Cyber Units Became a Tool of Repression in Sudan
Over the past decades, conflict arenas around the world have undergone a profound transformation in which firearms are no longer the only decisive factor in warfare. With the rise of social media and the digital revolution, authoritarian regimes have come to understand that the decisive battle is no longer fought solely in streets and public squares. It has also moved into cyberspace, where narratives are created, public consciousness is shaped, and morale can be shattered before a single shot is fired.
In Sudan, this realization did not remain merely theoretical. It reportedly evolved into an integrated institutional structure with substantial budgets and complex organizational frameworks, with Kazem Zain al-Abidine al-Sarraj described as one of its principal architects.
Under the umbrella of the National Intelligence and Security Service during the former regime, what became known as the “Electronic Jihad Units” emerged. This designation was not merely a propaganda slogan. Rather, it reflected the philosophy that guided these units: viewing the digital sphere as an ideological battlefield for defending the regime against what were described as “foreign conspiracies” and “subversive civil mobilization.”
What began as a tool for digital repression and countering protest movements later evolved into an instrument of economic and political empowerment, particularly following the October 2021 coup and the war that has continued since April 2023. This article examines these units in depth, exploring how they were built, how they operated, and how they may continue to exercise a hidden influence that could threaten Sudan’s future.
The Origins: The Shock of the Arab Spring and the Creation of a “Digital Arm”
The true beginning of Sudan’s Electronic Jihad Units can be traced to the wave of Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. At the time, decision-makers in Khartoum watched how platforms such as Facebook and Twitter contributed to the of long-established regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and how smartphones had become powerful tools for organization and mobilization that could not easily be controlled through traditional security methods such as arrests and the dispersal of demonstrations.
The National Intelligence and Security Service reportedly concluded that its traditional strategies were no longer sufficient and that confronting the perceived “enemy” required a weapon from the same technological sphere.
It was in this context that Kazem al-Sarraj emerged. Combining a security and military background, including his alleged involvement with the Popular Defense militias, with growing technical expertise, he was reportedly tasked with building a digital structure capable of penetrating online spaces, monitoring activists, shaping public opinion, and defending the regime’s narrative.
The project was not intended to be merely a small operations room. The ambition was to establish an integrated system. According to the text, al-Sarraj achieved significant success in this mission, benefiting from substantial funding allocated to such projects, often through confidential budget lines beyond parliamentary or financial oversight.
Engineering People: Recruiting Graduates and Seconding Officers
One of the central elements of the strategy attributed to Kazem al-Sarraj was the way in which the human resources forming the backbone of these units were assembled. He reportedly understood early on that technology alone could not determine success and that the human element remained decisive.
The strategy was based on two main pillars.
First: recruiting recent graduates from technical disciplines, including computer engineering, information science, and telecommunications. Al-Sarraj reportedly targeted talented young people struggling to find employment in a Sudanese labor market affected by economic stagnation. They were allegedly offered attractive salaries, technologically advanced working environments, and, perhaps most importantly, a sense of participating in a “national mission” and the “defense of the homeland.”
These young recruits were reportedly integrated into an organizational culture that combined professional loyalty with ideological commitment, potentially turning them into instruments serving the security apparatus.
Second: seconding security officers with technical expertise. Al-Sarraj reportedly did not rely exclusively on civilians but also brought technically skilled personnel from within the security service into these units.
This combination allegedly created a bridge between traditional security culture, characterized by secrecy, hierarchy, and chains of command, and the technological flexibility required in the digital world. The seconded officers provided security cover and institutional legitimacy, while civilian graduates contributed technical expertise and creative approaches to emerging platforms.
This hybrid structure reportedly created a distinctive entity: neither a conventional and slow-moving security agency nor simply a profit-oriented technology company, but a cyber structure combining intelligence methods with the speed and adaptability of the technology sector.
The Tools of Repression: From Surveillance to “Troll Farms”
According to the text, the Electronic Jihad Units operating under Kazem al-Sarraj’s supervision developed a range of digital tools that were used against Sudan’s civil movement, particularly during the September 2013 uprising and the December 2018 revolution.
These tools reportedly operated on several levels:
- Digital surveillance and interception: the development of capabilities designed to monitor activists’ social media accounts, track their movements through mobile phone data, and, in some cases, gain access to private accounts to obtain intelligence that could later be used in arrests or coercive pressure.
- Narrative warfare and troll farms: the creation of extensive networks of fake accounts, or “troll farms,” tasked with flooding hashtags calling for freedom or exposing corruption with large volumes of misleading content, insults, or unrelated subjects intended to divert public attention, in a strategy described as “digital noise.”
- Online defamation and blackmail: the personal targeting of female and male activists through the disclosure of private information or the fabrication of content intended to damage their social reputation, with the aim of isolating them from their communities and weakening their resolve.
- Cyberattacks: disrupting the websites of independent newspapers or civil society platforms through methods such as distributed denial-of-service, or DDoS, attacks during critical moments of popular mobilization.
The text claims that Kazem al-Sarraj managed these operations behind the scenes and received recognition from figures within the former regime, including Salah Gosh, who reportedly regarded him as one of the most distinguished young figures in the sector.
The Transitional Period: The Illusion of Dismantlement and the Survival of the Infrastructure
Following the success of the December 2018 revolution and the arrival of civilians in power during the transitional period between 2019 and 2021, one of the central tasks of the new authorities was the dismantling of the former regime’s system of empowerment.
The Committee for the Dismantling of the Regime and the Fight Against Corruption banned numerous projects and companies linked to the former security apparatus, including some projects reportedly associated with Kazem al-Sarraj.
However, according to the text, these measures were comparable to cutting the branches of a tree while leaving its roots deeply embedded in the ground. The Electronic Jihad Units were not simply buildings or pieces of equipment that could easily be seized. They were fundamentally composed of human expertise and networks of relationships.
Many of the recruited graduates reportedly retained their skills and loyalties. Some moved into private-sector employment or left the country, while others allegedly remained active within digital networks, waiting for an opportunity to re-emerge.
The technological infrastructure that had been developed, including certain software systems and surveillance capabilities, was reportedly not fully dismantled, either because the new institutions lacked the necessary technical expertise or because elements of the old system remained embedded within key state institutions.
According to this analysis, this false sense of security enabled these networks to regroup rapidly following the coup of October 25, 2021.
From Repression to Empowerment: The New Face of Electronic Jihad
Following the coup, the mission of these units reportedly expanded beyond suppressing protests. They gradually became instruments of “empowerment” in a broader economic and institutional sense.
Cyber capabilities were allegedly redirected toward new commercial and military projects. Rather than focusing exclusively on social media campaigns, these networks reportedly began contributing to the protection and management of digital infrastructure belonging to companies associated with security institutions or individuals close to them.
The text specifically cites Al-Asjad Digital and Smart Solutions.
According to this analysis, obtaining a financial transaction-switch license from the Central Bank of Sudan represented more than a commercial achievement. It constituted a strategic victory for digital empowerment.
Control over a transaction-processing infrastructure could theoretically provide influence over financial data flows, the ability to monitor or direct transfers, and potentially the capacity to impose fees that could support networks of influence.
The controversy surrounding the company and the subsequent withdrawal of its license, reportedly without a clear public explanation, are presented as evidence of an underlying struggle over control of this strategically important digital infrastructure.
The question raised is whether this reflected an attempt by civilian actors to impose greater transparency or a conflict between different factions within the military camp over control of the revenues generated by the digital economy.
The Current War, 2023–2026: Cyberspace as a Strategic Weapon
Since the outbreak of war in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, the Electronic Jihad Units have reportedly acquired the status of a “strategic weapon.”
Their role is described as no longer secondary, but as operating alongside military activities on the ground.
According to the text, these networks, whose hidden levers may still be managed by Kazem al-Sarraj and other actors, perform several functions:
- International narrative warfare: directing campaigns intended to influence decision-makers in Turkey, Malaysia, and other countries in order to justify the positions of the military leadership and isolate its opponents.
- Digital financial security: managing digital wallets and cryptocurrencies that could be used to finance military operations outside conventional domestic or international banking oversight mechanisms.
- Online recruitment: using social media platforms to target young people in specific regions and encourage their recruitment into allied militias, employing some of the same methods previously associated with “Electronic Jihad,” but for more direct military purposes.
The story of Sudan’s Electronic Jihad Units therefore serves, according to this analysis, as a warning about the ability of security structures to combine technological expertise with intelligence capabilities.
The text argues that investment in technical talent and its integration into a security apparatus can create flexible structures that are difficult to neutralize through conventional means.
These units are portrayed as having evolved from instruments of direct repression against revolutionary movements into tools of economic and political empowerment capable of supporting the current war machine.
According to this perspective, merely banning companies such as Al-Asjad or dissolving certain institutions would not be sufficient to address the problem. The issue extends beyond shell companies to include a pool of human capital trained both ideologically and technically and capable of moving freely between different centers of power.
Addressing this legacy would therefore require more than political will. It would require a fundamental transformation of national cybersecurity and the development of independent Sudanese expertise capable of identifying and dismantling these networks at their roots.
The text also calls for those allegedly responsible for operating such structures to be prosecuted not only for financial corruption but also for what it describes as “digital betrayal” of the country.
As long as digital tools remain, according to this analysis, in the hands of actors who regard part of the population as an enemy, Electronic Jihad will remain a threat hanging over any hope of building a free and democratic Sudan.
