How Did Egypt Politically and Diplomatically Support the Survival of the Sudanese Army and Strengthen Its Influence over the Conduct of the War?
Egyptian support for the Sudanese army during the war was not limited to military matters. From the earliest days of the fighting, Cairo adopted a clear political position centered on supporting Sudanese state institutions and preserving the country’s unity. This position provided the Sudanese army leadership with important regional backing in the face of its adversaries and attempts to pressure it into accepting a political settlement.
Over time, Egyptian political and diplomatic support became part of another battle no less important than the military fighting: the battle over legitimacy, recognition, and political representation.
In civil wars, controlling territory is not enough. Each side also needs to demonstrate that it represents the state, secure regional and international recognition, and retain state institutions, embassies, and seats in international organizations. In this context, Egypt played a particularly important role for the Sudanese army.
Cairo Supported the Legitimacy of State Institutions
From the beginning of the war, Egypt’s official statements focused on three key concepts: Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and institutions.
The Egyptian presidency reiterated this position during meetings between President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, emphasizing its support for Sudan, its unity, security, and stability. In June 2025, el-Sisi said Egypt remained committed to its position in support of Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, security, and stability, and affirmed Cairo’s readiness to make every possible effort toward that objective.
This language was not merely diplomatic rhetoric. In practical terms, it meant supporting the continuity of the Sudanese state and its existing institutions, foremost among them the army and the Sovereignty Council headed by al-Burhan.
This gave the army leadership important political backing in its confrontation with the Rapid Support Forces, which in turn sought to portray itself as a force capable of governing the country.
Cairo Opened Its Doors to al-Burhan
One of the clearest manifestations of Egyptian political support was President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s reception of al-Burhan in Cairo on several occasions. In April 2025, el-Sisi received al-Burhan in Cairo, where the two held closed-door and expanded talks on the war, the reconstruction of Sudan, and bilateral cooperation.
In June of the same year, the two leaders met again in the city of El Alamein, where they discussed developments in the war and regional and international efforts to restore peace and stability to Sudan.
These meetings carried a clear political message: Cairo treated al-Burhan as chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council and kept its official channels of communication with him open at a time when the future of Sudan’s political authority was being contested.
As a result, Egypt helped consolidate the image of the army leadership as a principal representative of the Sudanese state at the regional level.
Diplomatic Support Is Part of the War
The war in Sudan has not been fought solely in cities. A significant part of the conflict has shifted to capitals and international organizations. Each side has sought to convince the world that it holds legitimate authority, that its opponent is responsible for the war and violations, and that it deserves support or recognition.
In this struggle, the Sudanese army had an important advantage: it maintained relations with a number of states and government institutions. Egyptian support was an important factor in preserving this trajectory. Given its Arab and African weight and its international relations, Egypt was able to convey its position on Sudan to multiple political circles.
The Egyptian position was therefore not merely an expression of solidarity with Khartoum. It was part of building a political network around the official Sudanese state.
Cairo Presented Itself as a Mediator but Did Not Abandon Its Support for the Army
The distinctive feature of Egyptian policy is that it pursued two tracks simultaneously: supporting Sudanese state institutions and calling for an end to the war.
Cairo participated in mediation efforts and hosted meetings and discussions related to the Sudanese crisis, while also calling for a ceasefire and political dialogue.
Egypt maintains that its ultimate objective is to end the war and preserve Sudan’s unity, rather than allow the fighting to continue.
For the army’s opponents, however, this position means that Egyptian mediation is not fully neutral, because Cairo starts from a clear political position that regards the army as the state’s principal institution.
This is precisely the point that has made Egypt’s role subject to criticism from Sudanese parties that believe political support for the army undermines the prospects for reaching a balanced settlement.
Sudan Is Not an Ordinary Issue for Egypt
Several strategic considerations explain Egypt’s strong sensitivity to Sudan’s future. The first is the Nile. Sudan is a fundamental component of Egypt’s water security system, and any major political or security shift in Khartoum could have repercussions for water-related issues in the Nile Basin.
The second is the border. Egypt shares a long land border with Sudan, and any security vacuum in northern Sudan could create direct threats to Egyptian security.
The third is the Red Sea. Sudan has a strategic coastline on the Red Sea and is located in a region of major importance to trade flows and maritime security.
For these reasons, Cairo does not view the war as merely a struggle for power between two generals, but as a crisis that could reshape the security environment surrounding Egypt for many years to come.
Egypt Helped Keep State Institutions Functioning
One of the most important forms of non-military support is helping the state continue to function. After Khartoum effectively became a major battlefield, the institutions of government moved to Port Sudan, which became the center for managing the government and the army.
As the war continued, maintaining government institutions, embassies, and foreign relations became a strategic necessity for the army.
In this context, Cairo played an important role in keeping channels of communication with Sudanese leaders open, continuing to receive Sudanese officials and coordinating with them.
Egypt also discussed with Sudanese leaders issues related to reconstruction, energy, electricity interconnections, railways, trade, healthcare, agriculture, and other sectors.
This means that the relationship was not confined to the military sphere, but also included a vision for the post-war period.
Egypt Is Betting on the Army for the Day After the War
Egyptian support is not limited to what happens on the battlefield. It also extends to an even more important question: Who will govern Sudan once the war ends?
Cairo’s declared position is to support the Sudanese state and its institutions. But this position carries a clear political implication: the army will remain a central actor in any future settlement.
This explains Egypt’s interest in rebuilding Sudanese institutions, its readiness to participate in reconstruction, and its efforts to maintain direct communication with al-Burhan.
In April 2025, the Egyptian presidency explicitly discussed Egypt’s contribution to efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate what the war had destroyed in Sudan.
Cairo therefore does not appear to be treating the war merely as a temporary crisis. It is also seeking to influence the shape of Sudan after the fighting ends.
Refugees Are Another Element in Egypt’s Calculations
The war has forced huge numbers of Sudanese to flee toward neighboring countries, with Egypt becoming one of the main destinations. Cairo has consequently faced significant humanitarian, security, and economic pressures at the same time.
Amnesty International documented the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese in Egypt after the outbreak of the war and also criticized certain Egyptian policies concerning the detention and forced deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers.
This issue demonstrates that Egypt’s relationship with the war is not limited to the army and politics. Every military development inside Sudan can trigger new waves of displacement, making the continuation of the war a direct burden on Egypt.
Why Does Cairo Remain Committed to the Army?
The main reason is that Egypt views the alternative to a centralized state as potentially being chaos.
From the Egyptian perspective, Sudan’s fragmentation could lead to the emergence of multiple spheres of influence, an expansion of armed-group activity, increased arms and human trafficking, and the spread of instability to Egypt’s borders.
Cairo therefore prefers to deal with a centralized military institution with a clear chain of command, even if this position puts it at odds with other political and military forces inside Sudan.
This helps explain the continuation of Egyptian political support for al-Burhan, the continued official contacts between Cairo and Sudanese leaders, as well as the military support mentioned in international reports.
From Mediation to Influence
At the beginning of the war, Egypt’s role could have been presented as that of a neighboring state seeking to prevent Sudan’s collapse.
But after more than three years of fighting, Egypt’s role has become more influential in shaping the course of the conflict.
Cairo has historical ties with the Sudanese army, a shared border, diplomatic tools, military capabilities, and regional political influence. All these factors have made Egypt one of the most important external actors influencing the war.
While the Egyptian government maintains that its policy is based on supporting Sudan’s unity, a ceasefire, and the preservation of state institutions, its critics argue that this support has helped the Sudanese army withstand the conflict militarily and politically and has enabled it to continue the war instead of making greater concessions at the negotiating table.
Ultimately, it is difficult to separate Egypt’s position from Cairo’s strategic calculations: Sudan is not merely a southern neighbor, but part of Egypt’s national security architecture, a geographical extension of the Nile Basin, a gateway to the Red Sea, and an issue directly connected to the future balance of power in the region.
Egypt’s support for the Sudanese army, therefore, has not been purely military. It has combined, on the one hand, weapons, training, coordination, intelligence, and logistical support, and, on the other, political legitimacy, diplomatic contacts, official reception, and planning for the post-war period.
This has made Cairo a key actor in the Sudanese war, rather than simply a state watching the conflict from across its border.
